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Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin:
Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or
Unsound Banking Practices
Heidi Mandanis Schooner*
The term "unsafe or unsound banking practices" serves as a statutory
trigger for virtually every key administrative sanction available against bank
directors. Congress has not defined either the term "unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices" or its counterpart "safety and soundness," leaving the federal
banking agencies considerable discretion in the interpretation and application
of the term. Given the potential breadth of the term, the banking agencies
have the ability to seek administrative remedies in cases covering a broad
range of director conducL Thus, "unsafe or unsound banking practices" is a
potent source of director liability.
Professor Schooner argues that "unsafe or unsound banking practices"
and the common law fiduciary duty of care appear to share the same theoreti-
cal basis. Although both concepts are derived from negligence theory, Profes-
sor Schooner shows that they retain certain vital differences in application. In
cases brought by the FDIC or the RTC as receivers for failed banks against
bank directors for breach of the fiduciary duty of care, the business judgment
rule requires courts to defer to directors' business decisions. In reviewing ad-
ministrative actions against bank directors for unsafe or unsound banking
practices, however, courts must defer to the banking agencies' determinations.
Professor Schooner argues that, as a result of this difference in application, the
principles of safety and soundness create a higher standard of care for bank
directors than that imposed by the common law fiduciary duty of care. She
suggests that this inconsistency proves most troublesome in the context of the
agencies' cease and desist power. She concludes that the banking agencies
could remedy this inconsistency by adopting policies that implement any of
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What would be slight neglect in the care of a quantity of iron might
be gross neglect in the care of a jewel. What would be slight neglect
in the care exercised in the affairs of a turnpike corporation, or even
of a manufacturing corporation, might be gross neglect in the care
exercised in the management of a savings bank intrusted with the
savings of a multitude of poor people, depending for its life upon
credit and liable to be wrecked by the breath of suspicion.'
Introduction
For most Americans today, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") logo displayed on the teller window or automated teller machine
1 Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880).
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offers assurance that their life's savings will not be lost2 because of the ne-
glect of bank3 managers. As the bank failures of the 1980s demonstrated,4
FDIC insurance5 shifts the cost of bank failures from individual depositors to
all taxpayers.
The existence of FDIC insurance, however, does not automatically place
today's banks in the company of the turnpike or manufacturing corporation
so vividly distinguished from the 19th-century savings bank by the New York
Court of Appeals.6 Although individual depositors are largely sheltered
from the direct effects of such failures, Congress's interest in preventing bank
failures remains strong.7 Because the activities of bank directors are inevi-
tably scrutinized when a bank fails, the debate continues over the standard of
care owed by bank directors.8
Recently, the controversy has centered on directors' liability for mone-
tary damages in suits9 brought by the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration ("RTC"), acting as receivers for failed institutions.10 In these
receivership cases, the FDIC and the RTC have asserted that directors are
personally liable for their negligent acts under state law." In response, direc-
tors have urged that Congress has prescribed gross negligence as the standard
of care applicable to bank directors.12 In the context of receivership actions,
however, this debate is not likely to continue for long with the same vigor.
As the number of bank failures continues to decrease, 13 we should witness a
2 The FDIC insures deposits up to $100,000 in accordance with certain rules regarding
aggregation of deposits and other limitations. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. V 1993).
3 In this Article, the term "bank" refers to both commercial banks and savings
institutions.
4 See genertilly NATIONAL COMM'N ON FIN. INsT. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCE-
MENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 29-61 (1993)
(describing the history and the collapse of the savings and loan industry); Carl Felsenfeld, The
Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7 (1991) (same).
5 The FDIC was created in 1933. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, sec. 8, § 12A, 48 Stat. 162,
168-80 (1933).
6 See supra text accompanying note 1.
7 Congress's particular interest in bank failures is evidenced by the "special bank insol-
vency regime" described by Professor Swire in his comprehensive article on bank insolvency.
See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again, 42 DUKE LJ. 469, 477-90
(1992).
8 See infra part I.
9 See infra part I.B.
10 The FDIC serves as receiver for failed commercial banks. The RTC serves as receiver
for failed thrifts. The term "receiver" means "a receiver, liquidating agent, conservator, commis-
sion, person, or other agency charged by law with the duty of winding up the affairs of a bank or
savings association or of a branch of a foreign bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(j) (Supp. V 1993). The
FDIC is also the primary federal regulator for state-chartered, federally insured banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The RTC
has no regulatory role.
1 See infra part I.B.
12 See infra part I.B.
13 In 1993, 42 commercial banks failed (compared to 1992, when 100 commercial banks
failed). This is the lowest number of commercial bank failures since 1982. In 1993, eight savings
institutions failed (compared to 1992, when 81 savings institutions failed). Bill to Ensure Fair
Treatment of U.S. Banks Abroad Progresses in House, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1539, at
3 (Mar. 18, 1994) (temporary pamphlet). The total number of commercial banks and savings
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corresponding drop in the number of actions brought against bank directors
by the FDIC and RTC as receivers.'
4
Bank directors, however, cannot drop their guard. With the passage of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
("FDICIA"), 15 Congress directed the federal banking agencies16 to exercise
their enforcement muscle long before an institution fails or faces imminent
threat of failure. FDICIA, with its provisions for prompt corrective action,
17
forces the regulators to assume a more formal and proactive role with regard
to supervision of operating institutions. 18 Under FDICIA, the source of lia-
bility for bank directors will likely shift from the receivership actions brought
by the FDIC and RTC to the formal enforcement actions brought by all of
the federal banking agencies.' 9
Unsafe or unsound banking practices long have served as a trigger for
director liability under every important formal enforcement provision in the
federal banking laws. 20 These provisions include cease and desist powers
(which can include the recovery of monetary damages); removal from office;
prohibition from participation in the banking industry; and civil money pen-
alties of up to one million dollars per day.2' Principles of safety and sound-
ness, therefore, are an important source of bank directors' duties.22
institutions considered "problem" institutions also has declined dramatically from 1492 in De-
cember 1990 to 433 in June 1994. FDIC Q. BANKiNG PROFILE 17 (Second Quarter 1994).
14 In fact, the RTC will be dissolved no later than December 31, 1995, and the FDIC will
take over its role as receiver for all failed depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m)(1)
(Supp. V 1993).
15 Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
16 The federal banking agencies are the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), and the Federal Reserve Board
("Fed"). The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for state-chartered commercial banks that
are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3) (Supp. V 1993). In
addition, the FDIC has the ability, under certain circumstances, to bring enforcement actions
against any insured bank and its officers, directors, and other affiliated professionals. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(t) (Supp. V 1993). The OCC is the primary federal regulator for all nationally chartered
commercial banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 93a (1988). The OTS is the primary federal regulator for
savings institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (Supp. V 1993). The Fed is the primary federal regulator
for bank holding companies and state-chartered commercial banks that are members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 1844 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This Article uses the terms
"regulator" and "agency" to refer to any or all of the four regulators.
17 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. V 1993); see also infra notes 140-143 and accompanying
text (discussing prompt corrective action).
18 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective Ac-
tion Decisions by the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 505, 528 (1993) (noting how a
once largely informal system of regulatory supervision- has given way to a more formal system).
19 See infra part III.C.
20 See infra part III.C.
21 All of the formal enforcement powers, except the removal and prohibition provisions,
also are applicable to bank officers, other professionals, and the bank itself. See infra note 170
(describing the "institution-affiliated party").
22 Surprisingly, the duties created by principles of safety and soundness have never re-
ceived the degree of attention showered on the standard of care applicable in receivership ac-
tions. See Cindy A. Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 J. CoRP'. L. 739 (1992);
David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New Defense for Direc-
tors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions-or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REv.
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Despite Congress's frequent reliance upon the phrases "unsafe or un-
sound" and "safety and soundness,"23 Congress never defined either
phrase-leaving that task to the agencies. 24 The regulators' authority to pro-
scribe unsafe or unsound banking practices often serves as the statutory ba-
sis for specific regulation of bank operations.25 This Article, however,
focuses on unsafe or unsound banking practices as a source of a general duty
of care for bank directors.26 This Article concludes that unsafe or unsound
banking practices should not be used to create a standard of care that is more
onerous than the standard ordinarily applicable to bank directors' conduct.
If Congress or the regulators wish to impose a higher standard of care on
bank directors, this should be accomplished by law or regulation, not by for-
mal enforcement actions based on unsafe or unsound banking practices.
Following this Introduction, Part I introduces bank directors' common
law fiduciary duty of care, discusses federal statutory preemption of those
duties, and highlights the effect of the business judgment rule on the dis-
charge of those duties. Drawing on legislative history and court and banking
agency interpretations, Part II attempts to identify a general definition for
unsafe or unsound banking practices. This Part concludes that safety and
soundness serves as an important gap-filler in the regulatory scheme and that
the agencies, when considering safety and soundness as a basis of director
liability, seem to view it as part of directors' fiduciary duties.
Part III addresses the agencies' application of unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices as a basis for director liability. It analyzes the formal enforce-
ment provisions that rely upon unsafe or unsound banking practices as a
trigger for director liability and outlines the circumstances that typically give
rise to a finding that a director has engaged in an unsafe or unsound banking
practice. Next, Part IV compares the theoretical foundations of unsafe or
unsound banking practices with those of fiduciary duty, concluding that both
principles share negligence theory as a common underpinning.
1703 (1992); Steven B. Price, Note, FIRREA's Statute on the Standard of Liability for Bank
Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Textualism, 30 IDAHo L. Rlv. 219
(1993-94); Jon Shepherd, Note, The Liability of Officers and Directors Under the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 1119 (1992); Grahame
K. Wells, Note, FIRREA, State Law, and the Federal Financial Institution Director's Duty of
Care: The Case for an Exclusive Federal Cause of Action, 13 AN. REv. BANKiNG L. 395 (1994);
Eric G. Zajac, Comment, FIRREA and Federal Common Law: The Extent to Which They Pre-
empt State Law Regarding the Duties and Standard of Liability Imposed upon Financial Institu-
tion Directors, 37 VILL L. REv. 1461 (1992).
23 These terms appear throughout the federal banking statutes and regulations in many
contexts other than director liability. See, eg., 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4) (1988) (transactions with
affiliates); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(3) (Supp. V 1993) (minimum capital requirements); 12 U.S.C.
§ 2901(b) (1988) (community reinvestment). This Article, however, focuses only on the applica-
tion of the safety and soundness concept to director liability.
24 Congress has given some indication of certain types of activities that the agencies may
conclude are unsafe or unsound, but it has never given a complete definition. See infra part II.B.
25 See infra part II.D.2.
26 See infra part II.A (discussing unsafe or unsound banking practices as a regulatory gap-
filler).
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Given their similarities, Part V attempts to reconcile bank directors'
safety and soundness duty with their fiduciary duty. Part V begins by com-
paring the receivership cases brought against directors for breach of fiduciary
duty with the formal enforcement actions brought against directors for un-
safe or unsound banking practices. This Part observes that both types of
cases rely upon negligence theory; yet, it notes that in receivership cases the
courts defer to directors' judgments (through the operation of the business
judgment rule or exculpatory state statutes), while in formal enforcement ac-
tions the courts defer to the agencies' judgments (through the operation of
basic principles of administrative law). This Part explores the justification for
treating bank directors' business judgments differently in these contexts and
determines that although the inconsistency may be resolved in part through
the operation of independent standards of culpability as required in most of
the formal enforcement actions, some inconsistency remains. To resolve this
inconsistency, Part V concludes that the federal banking agencies should
adopt enforcement policies that require all formal enforcement actions
brought against directors for unsafe or unsound banking practices to meet at
least the standard of culpability required in receivership cases.
I. Bank Directors' Fiduciary Duty of Care
All corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty of care27 to their institu-
tions.28 Courts, however, offer varied interpretations of this duty as applied
to the conduct of bank directors. This Part provides an overview of bank
directors' duty of care. It discusses the effect of federal preemption on the
duty of care in the context of receivership actions brought by the FDIC and
RTC as well as the business judgment rule's effect on the duty of care.
27 The term "fiduciary" can cause confusion because of the term's use in the law of trusts.
For this reason, the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act avoided the term "fiduciary"
in establishing the general standard of care for all directors. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr
§ 8.30 cmt. 1 (1991); see also infra part I.A (discussing the duty of care).
In addition to the duty of care, directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their institutions.
The Delaware Supreme Court described the duty of loyalty as
a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably,
the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the
interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to
make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no
conflict between duty and self-interest.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). See generally S. Samuel Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 Ho'srRA L. REV. 93, 115-18 (1979) (discussing the duty of loyalty);
Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty,
and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 605, 623-28 (1987) (same).
28 For a discussion of whether the duty of care is owed to third parties such as depositors,
borrowers, or federal regulators, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking
Regulation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 7 (1993).
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A. Duty of Ordinary Care
Long before the banking crises of the 1930s and the 1980s, the Supreme
Court articulated the duty of care for bank directors. In 1891, the Supreme
Court held in Briggs v. Spaulding29 that "directors must exercise ordinary
care and prudence in the administration of the affairs of a bank."30 This flex-
ible standard, derived from tort law, "depends upon the subject to which it is
to be applied, and each case has to be determined in view of all the circum-
stances."31 Since Briggs, many courts have applied this duty of ordinary care
in evaluating the conduct of bank directors.
3 2
Most courts and commentators accept Briggs as the source of bank
directors' duty of care33 but have interpreted that duty inconsistently.
Although the Supreme Court in Briggs sets forth a standard of ordinary care,
there is language in the case that suggests that the Court applied a standard
of gross negligence. 34 Even so, some courts, relying on Briggs and other
older decisions, have applied a standard of care to bank directors that is more
demanding than the standard applied to other corporate directors35
29 141 U.S. 132 (1891). The receiver of the First National Bank of Buffalo brought this
action against the former directors of the bank for their failure to manage properly the bank's
affairs. See id at 134-40.
30 Id. at 165. The Court found that the duty of ordinary care
includes something more than officiating as figure-heads. [Directors] are entitled
under the law to commit the banking business, as defined, to their duly-authorized
officers, but this does not absolve them from the duty of reasonable supervision,
nor ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability because of want of
knowledge of wrong-doing, if that ignorance is the result of gross inattention ....
Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 147. This duty of care is consistent with the duty of care set forth in the Model
Business Corporation Act, which provides that a director must act "with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." MODEL BusmnESs
CORP. Acr § 8.30(a)(2) (1991).
32 Se4 eg., Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1919); FDIC v. Mason, 115 F.2d
548, 551 (3d Cir. 1940); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 1938); FDIC v. Butcher,
660 F. Supp. 1274, 1277-78 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1013 (W.D. Ark.
1907); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. 42,44 (Mass. 1930); Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 287,
290-91 (Utah 1899).
33 See RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1464 (D. Colo. 1993) (mem.); Washington
Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256,1265 (D.D.C. 1993) (mem.); John C. Deal, Liability of
Bank Directors, 39 Bus. LAW. 1033, 1038 (1984); Schipani, supra note 22, at 749; Harris Wein-
stein, Advising Corporate Directors After the Savings and Loan Disaster, 48 Bus. LAW. 1499,
1504 (1993).
34 See supra note 30 (quoting Court language that imposes director liability for "gross
inattention"); see also McMurray, Note, supra note 27, at 622 n.109 (citing Briggs as holding
directors to a gross negligence standard).
35 See Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543,547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 (1940);
Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 903 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (mem.); Billman v. State of Md. Deposit
Ins. Fund Corp., 593 A.2d 684, 697-98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 447 (Md.
1991); Barber v. Kolowich, 277 N.W. 189, 191-92 (Mich. 1938); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S.
455, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Professor Schipani argues that in most of the early cases purporting to
apply a higher standard of care to bank directors, the banking official would have been subjected
to liability under a standard of ordinary care. Schipani, supra note 22, at 742.
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Application of the higher standard36 stems perhaps from the recognition
that conduct that amounts to ordinary care in the affairs of some businesses
may not amount to ordinary care in the affairs of a bank.3 7 The desire to
protect depositors from the loss of their life savings undoubtedly influenced
this rationale's formulation, which predates the creation of the federal de-
posit insurance program.3 8 Nevertheless, even with FDIC insurance cover-
age, some recent decisions have held bank directors to a higher degree of
care than that owed by other corporate directors.
39
B. Statutory Preemption in Receivership Cases
Directors' common law duty of care becomes a central issue when a
bank becomes insolvent. When a bank fails, the FDIC and the RTC have the
power as receivers to step into the shoes of the failed bank. To recoup losses
incurred by the bank, the FDIC and the RTC may sue former directors for
breach of the fiduciary duties owed to their institutions.40 Because Congress
has spoken on this subject, the issue becomes whether, in actions brought by
the FDIC or RTC as receivers, the traditional common law duties owed by
directors have been preempted by federal statute.
36 Of course, courts that purport to apply a higher standard of care to a bank director's
conduct are simply recognizing that the circumstances surrounding the affairs of a bank, i.e., the
safekeeping of customers' deposits, may require a different type of conduct in discharging the
duty of ordinary care. Such circumstances do not raise the standard of care above ordinary care
but affect the manner in which the duty of ordinary care is met.
37 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Conversely, one district court noted the dan-
ger in this type of reasoning:
[I]f, as here, we are considering bank directors, the ordinary bank director, that is,
the person who ordinarily acts as such a director, is the standard of comparison to
be used as the criterion by which the requisite care must be measured and deter-
mined, and, unless the court keeps that in mind ... there is danger that the court
may impose upon the defendants a greater duty than is required by the applicable
rule of law. The natural impulse of the judge trying such a case is to expect and
demand a high degree of care on the part of such a bank director and to believe
that the ordinary bank director is, as the judge is likely to conceive that he himself
would be (and perhaps in fact would be), a very careful, conservative, prudent di-
rector. It is only natural for a judge to think of himself as a bank director of this
ultraconservative type, rather than as a director of the average, ordinary type.
Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924, 929-30 (W.D. Ky. 1934), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 1936) (holding that no question of com-
mon law negligence was presented for review), rev'd, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (per curiam).
38 Schipani, supra note 22, at 742.
39 Id. at 750-51 (discussing the decision in Biliman v. State of Maryland Deposit Insurance
Fund Corp. as an example of a recent decision holding bank directors to a higher degree of
care).
Moreover, the existence of FDIC insurance may serve as a basis for expanding, rather than
contracting, the duties of bank directors because federal regulators have argued that federally
insured banks and their officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to the regulators themselves.
See Baxter, supra note 28, at 15-31 (arguing against the application of a fiduciary duty in favor of
the federal regulators).
40 Because the receiver steps into the shoes of the bank itself, it may bring any actions that
would have been available to the failed bank. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048,
2054 (1994). It is not unusual for the FDIC or RTC, as receivers, or any of the banking regula-
tors, to rely on a fiduciary duty owed to a third party as a basis for a receivership action or a
formal enforcement proceeding. See Baxter, supra note 28, at 14.
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The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA") 4' amended section 1821(k) of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act ("FDIA").42 The FDIA allows the FDIC and the RTC, acting as
receivers, to bring actions against bank directors for monetary damages. Sec-
tion 1821(k) imposes liability on directors for gross negligence as defined by
applicable state law43 but contains a savings clause that provides that
"[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [FDIC or
RTC] under other applicable law."44 Because some state laws and arguably
federal common law45 hold bank directors to a standard of ordinary care-a
higher degree of care than gross negligence46-FIRREA has required courts
to address the issue of whether section 1821(k) preempts state law, federal
common law, or both.47
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that section 1821(k) does not
preempt a state cause of action for simple negligence.48 The majority of dis-
trict courts concur.49 The Seventh Circuit, however, has relied on choice of
law principles to find that a state law cause of action is not available to the
41 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
42 Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950).
43 Section 1821(k) provides that a bank director or officer "may be held personally liable
for monetary damages in any civil action by [the FDIC or RTC] ... for gross negligence ... as
such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp.
V 1993).
44 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
45 The language of the Briggs decision could be used to support either a simple negligence
standard or a gross negligence standard. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. But see
Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers of
Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section
1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 169, 193 (1994) (arguing
that the federal common law standard should be gross negligence).
46 See supra part I.A. The fiduciary duty of ordinary care can be described as a simple
negligence standard. Although breach of fiduciary duty and negligence are typically pled as
separate causes of action (and different statutes of limitations may apply), they theoretically
involve the same level of care because the concept of "ordinary care" is equivalent to the "rea-
sonable person" standard of care in negligence theory. See infra note 228 (discussing the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts). Consequently, some district courts have treated claims of breach of
fiduciary duty as analytically equivalent to claims of negligence. See RTC v. Vanderweele, 833 F.
Supp. 1383, 1386-87 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (mem.); Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp.
1256, 1271 (D.D.C. 1993) (mem.).
47 See Schipani, supra note 22; Fischer, Comment, supra note 22; Price, Note, supra note
22.
48 See FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440
(1993); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 448 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516
(1992). Both courts found that the language of § 1821(k) preserves a state cause of action for
simple negligence. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 538; Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
49 See, eg., FDIC v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1568 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (mem.); FSLIC v.
Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1363-64 (M.D. La. 1992); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1276
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (mem.); FDIC v. Williams, 779 F. Supp. 63,64 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (mem.); FDIC v.
Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828,832 (D. Colo. 1991); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919,922 (W.D. Okla.
1991); FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1991); FDIC v. Burrell, 779 F. Supp.
998, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1991). But see FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn. 1991)
(mem.) (holding that § 1821(k) precludes FDIC actions based upon state law for conduct not
amounting to gross negligence).
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RTC in a suit against directors of a federally chartered financial institution
conducting business in more than one state.50 With respect to federal com-
mon law governing officer and director liability, the Fifth and Seventh Cir-
cuits have held that section 1821(k) preempts any federal common law in
suits brought by the FDIC or RTC as receivers.51 Several district courts have
reached the same conclusion.
52
C. Effect of the Business Judgment Rule on Common Law Duties
Cases alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of care involve often a re-
view of directors' business judgments. Inherently, business judgments in-
volve risk-taking, and risk-taking sometimes leads to losses. In reviewing
these judgments, however, courts have expressed the need to refrain from
second-guessing directors' business decisions.53 This judicial deference pro-
vides the foundation for the business judgment rule.54
The business judgment rule manifests itself in several different forms.55
Under the recently adopted American Law Institute ("ALI") version of the
business judgment rule, directors fulfill their duty of care if they (1) make
disinterested business judgments on an informed basis, to the extent they rea-
sonably believe is appropriate under the circumstances, and (2) rationally be-
lieve that the business judgment made is in the best interest of the
50 RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit applied
the internal affairs doctrine, which "recognizes the benefits of i1sing one rule of law to determine
the duties and liability of directors and officers whose firm may do business in many states." Id.
at 1122. Because the case was against the former officers and directors of the Security Savings
and Loan Association-a federally chartered financial institution doing business in more than
one state-the Seventh Circuit held that federal, not state, law applied. Id. at 1124. But see
RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151, 153-54 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Chapman's application of the
internal affairs doctrine and holding that a state statute of limitations is available to the RTC in a
suit against directors of a federally chartered financial institution).
51 See RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,
420 (7th Cir. 1993). Because of a recent Supreme Court decision, it is questionable whether
there is a federal common law governing the duty of care of bank directors. See O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2052-54 (1994) (finding no federal common law governing the
tort liability of attorneys providing services for banks in receivership).
52 See, eg., RTC v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302,307 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (mem.); FDIC v. Mintz,
816 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1993); RTC v. Hecht, 818 F. Supp. 894, 901 (D. Md. 1992)
(mem.); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187,190 n.1 (W.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.
1993); Miller, 781 F. Supp. at 1276. But see FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill.
1992) (stating that § 1821(k)'s language evidences "the intent to preserve the FDIC's rights
under other laws, including state and federal common law").
53 See e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 999 (1990), and rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); International Ins. Co. v.
Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989).
54 For a discussion of the origins of the business judgment rule, see Arsht, supra note 27, at
97-100.
55 See generally R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judg-
ment Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337 (1993); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Mean-
ingless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL_ L. Rav. 287 (1994); Charles Hansen, The Duty
of Care, the Business Judgment Rule and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 48 Bus. LAw. 1355 (1993). All forms of the rule require that directors act in good faith
and without conflicts of interest.
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corporation.5 6 The effect of the ALI business judgment rule is to apply (1) a
standard of ordinary care to directors' decisionmaking process and (2) a
lesser standard (gross negligence, perhaps) to the substance of the decision.57
Delaware's business judgment rule is expressed as a presumption that
directors have "acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.158 The
application of the Delaware rule, in effect, turns the directors' fiduciary duty
of care into a gross negligence standard of care.59 Commentators have con-
cluded that the Delaware rule "means that greater deference will be given to
any evidence presented by the defendant-directors and, thus, more evidence
will be required of the plaintiff. '60 Others interpret the Delaware rule as a
substantive legal rule that, like the ALI rule, "limits the duty of care solely to
56 The ALI provision provides as follows:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty
under this Section if the director or officer:.
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS § 4.01(c) (1992). The "duty under this Section" provides that a director must act "in
good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." Id. § 4.01(a).
The Model Business Corporation Act does not include a business judgment rule. Nor, how-
ever, does it exclude the possibility of such a rule:
In view of [the] continuing judicial development, section 8.30 does not try to codify
the business judgment rule or to delineate the differences, if any, between that rule
and the standards of director conduct set forth in this section. That is a task left to
the courts and possibly to later revisions of this Model Act.
MODEL BusmEss CORP. Act § 8.30 official cmt. (1991).
57 Professor Gevurtz explains:
Essentially, the ALI proposes to focus the protective thrust of the business
judgment rule on limiting judicial scrutiny of the substance of the directors' deci-
sion. The ALI formulates a standard of reasonable belief regarding the process the
directors use to reach their decision, or, more specifically, whether directors gath-
ered adequate information before acting. This would appear consistent with the
norm of ordinary negligence. When it comes to the substance of the directors'
decision, however, the ALI's proposed version of the business judgment rule low-
ers the standard of care to a rational belief. The ALI's comments suggest this ra-
tional belief standard may be similar to an absence of gross negligence.
Gevurtz, supra note 55, at 301 (footnote omitted).
58 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
59 The court in Aronson explained that "[w]hile the Delaware cases use a variety of terms
to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judg-
ment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence." Id. at 812; see also
Stevens & Nielson, supra note 45, at 191 ("Like Delaware, many states have adopted and ap-
plied the business judgment rule so as to create a gross negligence standard of care for directors
and officers."). But see RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (D. Colo. 1993) (mem.)
("[Tihe business judgment rule does not convert ordinary negligence to gross, willful or wanton
negligence, but rather, it is an affirmative defense, to an ordinary negligence claim.").
60 Balotti & Hanks, supra note 55, at 1348.
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the process by which the decision is reached and prevents liability if the deci-
sion was made with the requisite good faith."'61
Bearing in mind the different forms of the business judgment rule,62 the
rule generally defers to directors' decisions and focuses a court's review of
those decisions on the decisionmaking process rather than on the decisions'
content or results; the inquiry centers on whether the directors were in-
formed and whether they acted in good faith and without conflicts of
interest.63
Significant authority supports the proposition that the business judgment
rule applies to the conduct of bank directors.64 In addition, the banking
agencies' enforcement guidelines support the application of the business
judgment rule.65 This agency support, however, seems incongruous when
juxtaposed with the FDIC and RTC positions in recent receivership cases
arguing in favor of applying a simple negligence standard.66 Nevertheless, in
the final analysis, most states, through the operation of the business judgment
61 Hansen, supra note 55, at 1361.
62 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
63 For an in-depth discussion of all of the elements comprising the business judgment rule,
see Hansen, supra note 55, at 1363-69.
64 See FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 306 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (mem.); RTC v.
Vanderweele, 833 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 nA (N.D. Ind. 1993) (mem.); FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp.
1541, 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1993); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 355-57 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (mem.);
Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1268 (D.D.C. 1993) (mem.); FDIC v.
Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450, 451-52 (C.D. Ill. 1989).
Some authority, however, supports the proposition that the judicial deference afforded to
directors by the business judgment rule should not apply to bank directors. See Holland v.
American Founders Life Ins. Co., 376 P.2d 162, 166 (Colo. 1962); Allied Freightways, Inc. v.
Cholfin, 91 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Mass. 1950); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403, 408
(Mass. 1922). Moreover, the authority supporting the application of a higher standard of care
for bank directors (i.e., a higher standard than applied to other corporate directors) could be
used to argue that the business judgment rule should not apply to bank directors. See supra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing the authority imposing a higher standard of care
on bank directors).
65 For example, the OTS issued a statement in 1992 regarding the duties of bank directors
that provides: "The OTS will not bring civil claims against directors and officers who fulfill their
responsibilities, including the duties of loyalty and care, and who make business judgments on a
fully informed basis and after proper deliberation." Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of
Directors and Officers of Insured Depository Institutions, OTS 92-163 (Nov. 16, 1992) (emphasis
added).
Similarly, in a cover letter to the FDIC's guidelines on director liability, FDIC General
Counsel Alfred J.T. Byre wrote: "The FDIC wants to make clear that it will not bring civil suits
against those who fulfill their responsibilities and who make reasonable business judgments on a
fully informed basis and after proper deliberation." New FDIC Guidelines Issued to Clarify the
Responsibilities of Bank Directors and Officers, FDIC FIL-87-92 (Dec. 17, 1992) (quotation
omitted) (emphasis added). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") (the former
regulator of thrifts) issued a policy statement in 1987 strongly supporting the business judgment
rule. Accountability of Directors and Officers; Policy Statement, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,682, 22,683
(1987) ("[T]he [FHLBB's] intent [is] not to second-guess directors and officers who have exer-
cised business judgment after due diligence and reasonable care in the performance of their
duties.").
66 See supra part I.B.
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rule or other exculpatory statutes,67 would give deference to the decisions of
bank directors, holding them effectively to a gross negligence standard,
rather than a more onerous standard like simple negligence. 68
II. Directors' Safety and Soundness Duty: Defining Unsafe or
Unsound Banking Practices
Setting aside for the moment bank directors' fiduciary duty of care, bank
directors have duties that arise from regulatory principles of safety and
soundness. This Part seeks to identify a general definition for unsafe or un-
sound banking practices, considering congressional intent and both court and
agency interpretations.
A. Introduction: The Regulatory Gap-Filler
Safety and soundness, an "amorphous concept, '69 is an essential princi-
ple in the regulation of the banking industry. Congress intended "unsafe or
unsound banking practices" to be a broad, generic term, without strict defini-
tion.70 Because Congress left it to the agencies to decide what practices are
unsafe or unsound, principles of safety and soundness act to close the gaps in
the regulatory framework.71
This gap-filler is necessary given the complexities of the banking indus-
try. Despite the fact that the banking industry is one of the most highly regu-
lated industries in this country,72 neither Congress nor the federal banking
agencies could (or should) attempt to regulate specifically each and every
bank activity. Any such attempt would prove prohibitively costly and would
67 For a survey of these state laws, see Schipani, supra note 22, at 751-56; Stevens & Niel-
son, supra note 45, at 193-231. Note, however, that statutes exculpating acts of gross negligence
would be preempted by § 1821(k)'s gross negligence standard in receivership actions by the
FDIC and RTC. See FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 446 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed,
113 S. Ct. 516 (1992); FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Minn. 1991) (mem.).
68 See, e.g., RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357,1365 n.13 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining considera-
tion of whether § 1821(k) preempts a more onerous state standard because Louisiana's standard
of care is gross negligence).
69 Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
70 See infra part II.B.
71 See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the
Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CA. L. REa. 1019, 1043 (1993).
72 The regulatory burden on banks draws constant criticism from bankers. See Shannon
Henry, IBAA's Casey Leads Charge Against Red Tape, Am. BANKER, Mar. 17,1994, at 8 (noting
that bank regulation has quintupled since 1985). The regulators themselves share these con-
cerns. See Claudia Cummins, Fed's LaWare Sees Red Tape Struggle Growing for Banks, AM.
BANKER, June 14, 1994, at 1 (noting that a Federal Reserve Governor predicted even greater
regulatory burdens on banks in the future); Shannon Henry, OCC Official Rewrites the Rules to
Smooth the Regulatory Process, Am. BANKER, May 12, 1994, at 8 (discussing an OCC goal to
comprehensively review national bank regulation). One of the primary justifications for the
heavy regulatory burden on banks is the moral hazard inherent in our banking system: because
bank managers know that failed-bank losses will be borne principally by the FDIC, they are
arguably encouraged to take excessive risks. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual
Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1987).
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likely fail.73 Moreover, neither Congress nor the regulators are likely to pos-
sess the prescience to enact laws and regulations that would address rapid
changes in the banking industry.74
When Congress or the regulators determine to prescribe an aspect of
banks' operations, directors must ensure banks' compliance. But even in
those instances where Congress or the regulators have not addressed an area
of bank operations, directors must act in accordance with the gap-filling prin-
ciples of safety and soundness.
Principles of safety and soundness have been a source of directors' du-
ties since as early as 1933 when Congress authorized removal proceedings
against national bank directors for unsafe or unsound banking practices.75
Today, unsafe or unsound banking practices serve as a statutory trigger for
every important formal enforcement proceeding available against bank direc-
tors.76 Although a violation of law or regulation often constitutes an unsafe
or unsound banking practice,77 the difficulty lies in identifying those unsafe
or unsound banking practices that do not also violate a law or regulation.
The remainder of Part II addresses this difficulty.
B. Congress's Definition of Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices
Although Congress has never defined unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices, it has described certain discrete practices as unsafe or unsound.78 In
73 Commenting on the dangers of a specific definition for safety and soundness, one Ad-
ministrative Law Judge stated that the
formulation of such a definition would probably operate to exclude those practices
not set out in the definition, even though they might be highly injurious to an insti-
tution under a given set of facts or circumstances or a scheme developed by unscru-
pulous operators to avoid the reach of the law.
*** Bank *** Bank, in 1 FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5069, at A-950 (Ar-
thur L. Beamon & Nancy L. Alper eds. Supp. 1992).
74 For example, the financial industry's hot topic in 1994 was derivatives. See Claudia
Cummins, Gonzalez Is Asking Regulators to 7Ighten Reins on Hedge Funds, AM. BANKER, Mar.
28, 1994, at 3 (reporting that members of Congress are calling for more regulation of deriva-
tives); Regulators Comment on Hedge Fund Exposure for Financial Institutions, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 1544, at 2-4 (Apr. 18, 1994) (temporary pamphlet) (reporting that regulators
downplayed the potential risks that derivatives pose to financial institutions). Yet, no banking
laws specifically and comprehensively regulate bank directors' duties with respect to derivative
activities. There is, however, pending legislation in this area. See, e.g., Risk Management Im-
provement and Derivative Oversight Act of 1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.; Derivative
Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1995, H.R. 31, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Moreover, the
agencies have published examination guidelines. See Examination Guidance for Financial De-
rivatives, FDIC FIL-34-94 (May 18, 1994); Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, OCC
BC-277 (Oct. 27, 1993).
75 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 30, 48 Stat. 162, 193-94.
76 For a discussion of these formal enforcement proceedings, and the liability that can
result from such proceedings, see infra part III.A.
77 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.1
(8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (noting that an unsafe or unsound practice included a failure to
maintain adequate credit information on certain bank investments in violation of 12 C.F.R.
§ 1.8); Richard M. Roberson, FDIC-92-122e, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 47, at *41 (Feb. 22,
1994) (stating that a violation of state lending limit statutes constituted an unsafe or unsound
banking practice).
78 For example, the Director of the OTS may treat the failure of any savings association to
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addition Congress, in 1991, required each federal banking agency to adopt
regulations prescribing standards for safety and soundness in three areas: (1)
operations and management, (2) asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation,
and (3) employee compensation. 79
Apart from these piecemeal statutory indications of what Congress
means by unsafe or unsound banking practices, the only evidence of congres-
sional intent comes from legislative history. Relevant legislative history in-
cludes the hearings concerning the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of
1966 ("FISA").80 FISA gave the agencies, inter alia, the power to issue cease
and desist orders in certain circumstances. 81 Under FISA, one of the bases
for the use of such power was the finding of unsafe or unsound banking
practices.82
During the debates on FISA, several members of Congress expressed
concern over the vagueness of the term unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices.83 In response, John Home, then-Chairman of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, wrote a memorandum that explained:
Like many other generic terms widely used in the law, such as
"fraud," "negligence," "probable cause," or "good faith," the term
"unsafe or unsound practices" has a central meaning which can and
must be applied to constantly changing factual circumstances. Gen-
erally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any ac-
tion, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted
standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which,
if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institu-
tion, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance
funds.84
This memorandum has been cited as the "authoritative definition of an un-
safe or unsound [banking] practice." 85
maintain minimum capital as an unsafe or unsound banking practice. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(3)
(Supp. V 1993). The Federal Credit Union Act provides that the National Credit Union Admin-
istration Board may consider as an unsafe or unsound banking practice the failure of any insured
credit union to obtain an independent, outside auditor for any fiscal year requiring an outside
audit. 12 U.S.C. § 1782(a)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
79 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of these standards for safety and
soundness, see infra part II.D.2.
80 Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
81 See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text (discussing the agencies' cease and desist
power).
82 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (Supp. V 1993).
83 See 112 CONo. Rac. 24,984 (1966) (statement of Rep. Patman) (noting that other mem-
bers of Congress had been concerned about the exact meaning of unsafe or unsound banking
practices); id. at 25,008 (statement of Rep. Holifield) (expressing concern that no clear definition
of unsafe or unsound banking practices existed).
84 Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and S.
3695 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1966); 112
CONG. REc. 26,474 (1966) (memorandum submitted by John Home, Chairman of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board).
85 Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th
Cir. July 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
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The only other significant legislative history, also from the 1966 FISA
hearings, suggests that violations of safety and soundness must involve a risk
to the federal bank insurance fund.86 Representative Wright Patman, then-
Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, explained the
breadth of the delegation of cease and desist and removal powers to the
agencies: "[T]he cease-and-desist powers and management removal powers
are aimed specifically at actions impairing the safety or soundness of our in-
sured financial institutions. These new flexible tools relate strictly to the in-
surance risk and to assure the public of sound banking facilities. '87 This
language suggests that Congress has viewed safety and soundness-based reg-
ulation as a guard against the threat of bank insolvency.
88
C. Courts' Definition of Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices
Because the vast majority of formal enforcement actions against banks
and their officers and directors are settled by consent, the courts have had
few opportunities to consider the meaning of unsafe or unsound banking
practices. When confronted with the issue, courts have deferred to the agen-
cies' interpretation of the statutory language.
89
In seeking a general definition for unsafe or unsound banking practices,
the courts have relied on either Chairman Home's definition 9° or one almost
identical to it. The courts in the latter group follow the Eighth Circuit in
defining unsafe or unsound banking practices as "conduct deemed contrary
86 See Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies: A "Roguish" Concurrence
with Professor Baxter, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 65-66 (1993) (noting that Congress
sought to prevent a high magnitude of injury to banks by including the term "unsafe or unsound
practice" in FISA).
87 112 CONG. REC. 24,984 (1966) (statement of Rep. Patman).
88 See also Baxter, supra note 28, at 27 (arguing, inter alia, that the statutory structure of
the formal enforcement provisions "strongly suggests that Congress has always assumed that the
safety/soundness principle took care of actions carrying risks of insolvency").
89 See e.g., MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 862
(5th Cir. 1990) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991); Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1550 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 847 (1987); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (noting that the relevant agency is entitled to define unsafe or unsound practices), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); FSLIC v. Bass, 576 F. Supp. 848, 851-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mem.)
(stating that deference to bank regulators to define an unsafe or unsound practice is "particu-
larly appropriate").
To the extent that courts acknowledge varying degrees of deference, the deference afforded
the federal banking agencies with regard to the interpretation of unsafe or unsound practices is
"particularly deferential." Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1145-46 (10th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); see also First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith,
610 F.2d 1258,1264 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The Comptroller has wide discretion in the field of national
banking .... ); Heimann, 613 F.2d at 1168-69 ("[T]he Comptroller's discretionary authority to
define and eliminate 'unsafe and unsound' conduct is to be liberally construed."). See generally
Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Re-
sponsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER Fmi. L.Q. REP. 210, 211-12 (1993)
(stating that "banking agencies have been accorded a broad latitude to implement their safety/
soundness regulatory powers").
90 See, e.g., In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1994); Simpson v. OTS, 29 F.3d
1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994); MCorp, 900 F.2d at 863.
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to accepted standards of banking operations which might result in abnormal
risk or loss to a banking institution or shareholder." 91 Two differences be-
tween the Eighth Circuit's definition and Chairman Home's definition are
apparent. First, the Eighth Circuit's definition refers to "accepted standards
of banking operations" 92 and Chairman Home's definition refers to "ac-
cepted standards of prudent operation." 93 Second, the Eighth Circuit's defi-
nition targets a loss to "a banking institution or shareholder" 94 and Chairman
Home's definition targets a loss to "an institution, its shareholders, or the
agencies administering the insurance funds."95 The courts provide no indica-
tion that they deem these differences significant. 96
The Tenth Circuit has indicated that a finding of unsafe or unsound
banking practices is a "predictive judgment (i.e., what may happen if this
91 The Eighth Circuit attributes the wording of this definition to the Comptroller of the
Currency. First Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The following decisions rely on the definition provided in Eden: Seid-
man, 37 F.3d at 927, Northwest National Bank, Fayetteville, Arkansas v. United States, 917 F.2d
1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1990), First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697
F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983), and Smith, 610 F.2d at 1265.
In a later Eighth Circuit decision, however, the court defined unsafe or unsound banking
practices as "an abnormal risk of loss or harm contrary to prudent banking practices." Van Dyke
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 876 F.2d 1377, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added). This definition seems to combine Chairman Home's language and the language attrib-
uted by the Eighth Circuit to the Comptroller.
92 See supra text accompanying note 91 (emphasis added).
93 See supra text accompanying note 84 (emphasis added).
94 See supra text accompanying note 91.
95 See supra text accompanying note 84.
96 In a recent decision, the Third Circuit quoted both definitions without discussion of the
significant differences between the two. See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1994).
The first distinction, i.e., banking operations versus prudent operations, is a theoretical one that
may have little practical effect. Arguably, the Eighth Circuit's definition is less favorable to the
agencies because "accepted standards of banking operations" suggest the need to establish the
violation of some objective standard. "[S]tandards of prudent operation," on the other hand,
perhaps would allow for a more subjective determination by the agencies. The second distinc-
tion has greater potential significance. Chairman Home's definition proscribes conduct that
might result in a loss to the bank, its shareholders, or the FDIC as insurer (i.e., the agency
administering the insurance funds). See supra text accompanying notes 84, 91. The Eighth Cir-
cuit definition does not include a reference to potential losses to the FDIC. This variation is
potentially significant because proscribing conduct that might result in an abnormal risk or loss
to the FDIC as insurer is not necessarily the same as prohibiting conduct that might result in an
abnormal risk or loss to the institution or its shareholders. For example, engaging in a risky
business transaction with potential for great financial returns may not constitute an abnormal
risk or loss to the bank or its shareholders who ultimately seek to maximize profits. On the
other hand, the same activity may be viewed as an abnormal risk or loss to the FDIC, which has
interests in avoiding the bank's insolvency and not in maximizing profits. Although the courts
addressing the definition of unsafe or unsound banking practices have not focused their analysis
on the risk to the FDIC as insurer, some courts have indicated that a finding of unsafe or un-
sound banking practices must involve a risk to the bank's financial integrity. See infra notes 102-
117 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's Gulf Federal decision and its progeny). The courts' analyses in
these decisions, however, do not appear to be based on the differences between the Chairman
Home definition and the Eighth Circuit definition.
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practice continues)." 97 The principle of safety and soundness is "progres-
sive" 98-its application depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case.99 What may be an acceptable practice for one bank may be unsafe or
unsound for another. 10°
Although the courts have concluded that Congress never intended to
define unsafe or unsound, choosing instead to leave the implementation of
the phrase to the agencies,10 1 the courts have not blindly adopted the agen-
cies' interpretation of the term. The first judicial recognition of a limitation
on the breadth of safety and soundness was in Gulf Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,102 in which the Fifth Circuit limited
97 Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1146 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). The Tenth Circuit's characterization of safety and soundness determina-
tions as "predictive judgments" is supported by the language of both Chairman Home's and the
Eighth Circuit's definitions. Chairman Home's definition provides that unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices involve conduct, "the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnor-
mal risk or loss." See supra text accompanying note 84 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit's
definition discusses conduct that "might result in abnormal risk or loss." See supra text accompa-
nying note 91 (emphasis added).
98 See Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting an argument that unsafe or unsound lacks definite meaning by stating that one pur-
pose of the banking acts "is clearly to commit the progressive definition.., of such practices to
the expertise of the appropriate regulatory agencies").
99 See Franklin Say., 934 F.2d at 1145 ("What constitutes an unsafe and unsound condition
is somewhat of an amorphous concept, as it varies depending on the circumstances involved.").
100 See Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158
and S. 3695 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1966).
101 See, e.g., MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 862
(5th Cir. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
The use of the phrase "unsafe or unsound practices" in the federal banking laws has been
compared to the use of the language "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" in the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am.
v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164,1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); *** *** Bank
*** Bank, FDIC-85-215e, 1986 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 10, at *55 n.16 (July 17, 1986). In each
instance, Congress intentionally avoided precise language to allow "the meaning and application
[to be] arrived at by the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion." Id at *55 n.16.
102 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. July 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). It is important to
note that the decision in Gulf Federal was rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which
mandates judicial deference to agencies on matters of statutory interpretation in cases involving
ambiguous statutory language. Id at 843-44. In Gulf Federal, the Fifth Circuit refused to defer
to the agency's interpretation of the relevant statute's unsafe or unsound language. See 651 F.2d
at 263.
After Chevron, the Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider again the interpretation of unsafe
or unsound banking practices in MCorp. In MCorp, a bank holding company challenged the
Fed's authority to require the holding company to serve as a "source of strength" to its bank
subsidiaries by making its assets available to subsidiary banks that were suffering capital defi-
ciencies. 900 F.2d at 853, 857. Despite the Fifth Circuit's willingness to grant the Fed deference,
as Chevron requires, the court rejected the Fed's argument that its authority to order a holding
company to cease and desist from unsafe or unsound banking practices gave it authority to issue
the source-of-strength regulation. Id. at 862-63. The MCorp decision was affirmed in part and
reversed in part, on other grounds, by the Supreme Court. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
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the interpretation of unsafe or unsound banking practices to matters relating
to the financial integrity of the financial institution. 0 3
Gulf Federal had maintained a policy of calculating interest on loans
based on a 360-day year.104 Gulf Federal's board decided to change its policy
and use instead a 365-day year. Accordingly, it amended all of its loan docu-
mentation. 05 Although the board decided later to return to a 360-day year,
the bank never amended the loan documentation to reflect that change. 06
As a result, Gulf Federal charged its customers on the basis of a 360-day year
despite the fact that their contracts provided for a 365-day year. 0 7
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board'08 ("Bank Board") found this
practice unsafe or unsound and issued a cease and desist order.0 9 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the Bank Board's decision, concluding that Gulf
Federal's use of inconsistent contract terms had only a remote relationship to
Gulf Federal's financial integrity."0 The Fifth Circuit found the principle of
unsafe or unsound banking practices limited to "practices with a reasonably
direct effect on [a financial institution's] financial soundness.'
Respondents in formal enforcement actions often cite Gulf Federal as
support for requiring the federal banking agencies to show that the conduct
in question has a reasonably direct effect on an association's financial sound-
ness." 2 Such a limitation, however, particularly when asserted in the context
of an agency exercising its cease and desist power, proves an ineffective
shield against liability for two reasons. First, although Gulf Federal has been
cited favorably by the Ninth"3 and Third" 4 Circuits, a number of administra-
tive decisions reflect a refusal to apply the Gulf Federal limitation." 5 Second,
103 See Gulf Fed., 651 F.2d at 267.
104 The court explained that the 360-day calculation is more favorable to the lender be-
cause "the interest rate is computed as though there were 360 days in the year but is charged to
borrowers for 365 days." Id. at 261.
105 Id
106 Id.
107 Id. at 261-62.
108 In 1989, FIRREA replaced the Federal Home Loan Bank Board with the OTS as the
federal regulator of savings institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (Supp. V 1993).
109 Gulf Fed., 651 F.2d at 262.
110 See id. at 264. The total amount that the customers were overcharged was approxi-
mately $80,000, compared to Gulf Federal's assets of approximately $75 million. Id. at 264 n.4.
111 See id. at 264.
112 See infra note 115.
113 See Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1990).
114 See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 927 (3d Cir. 1994).
115 The OTS rejected the inclusion of the Gulf Federal limitation in its definition of safety
and soundness in the context of a cease and desist order, noting that "[a] requirement of such a
showing is fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of a cease and desist order, which is to
try to stop harm to an institution before it occurs." Neil M. Bush, No. ERC-90-30, 1991 OTS
LEXIS 94, at *35 n.16 (Apr. 18,1991) (Decision and Order). See infra notes 206-209 and accom-
panying text for further discussion on Bush. Similarly, the Administrative Law Judge in an OCC
action rejected the application of Gulf Federal. *** *** Nat'l Bank of *** ***, ***, OCC AA-
EC-85-43; AA-EC-85-44 (consolidated) (date missing); cf Fisher, supra note 86, at 66 (describ-
ing an unreported Fed removal order that asserted that safety and soundness "address[ ] the
nature, rather than the degree, of the departure from ordinary standards of prudent banking").
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because safety and soundness involves a largely "predictive judgment, 11 6 the
Gulf Federal limitation may be confined to a requirement that a finding of
unsafe or unsound banking practices must include a finding that the prac-
tices, if they continue, might threaten the financial integrity of the financial
institution. Such a requirement is less demanding than requiring a finding
that the practices actually threaten the financial integrity of the financial
institution 17
In another case limiting the scope of unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices, Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,118 the
Tenth Circuit held that the Bank Board's authority to ensure that financial
institutions conduct their affairs in a safe and sound manner did not give it
the authority to "use whatever means seem desirable to maintain the compet-
itive balance among financial institutions." 119 Otero Savings and Loan
("Otero") began to offer its customers interest-bearing checking accounts
over eight months before such accounts became legal' 2 under the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980.121 The Bank Board ordered
Otero, inter alia, to cease opening any new interest-bearing checking ac-
counts for 268 days. 122 By the time the Bank Board issued the cease and
desist order, however, interest-bearing checking accounts were perfectly
legal.123
The Bank Board asserted that its authority to issue the order stemmed
from its power to take affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from
violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices.124 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, disagreed and, in setting aside the Board's order, held that this power
did not allow the Bank Board "to restrict presently lawful conduct in at-
tempting to readjust competitive conditions claimed to have been disturbed
by past conduct."'1
Following the path laid in Gulf Federal, the decision in Otero Savings &
Loan implies that the concept of safety and soundness relates to maintaining
116 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
117 Some decisions prior to Gulf Federal, including two Fifth Circuit decisions, upheld the
OCC's finding of unsafe or unsound banking practices even though such practices were not of
the magnitude that would immediately threaten the financial integrity of the financial institution.
See First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1980); Independent
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 823 (1980); Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 896-97 (5th Cir.
1978).
118 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).
119 Id. at 288.
120 Id. at 281-282.
121 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
122 Otero Say. & Loan, 665 F.2d at 286.
123 Id. at 286-87.
124 Id. at 287.
125 Id. at 289.
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the financial integrity of a financial institution, rather than providing the fed-
eral banking agencies with unlimited power to restrict any otherwise-lawful
activities of the institution.
26
D. Agencies' Interpretation of Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices
As discussed above, in the event of judicial review, courts will defer to
the agencies' interpretation of the statute.127 Accordingly, the agencies' in-
terpretation of unsafe or unsound banking practices has special significance.
The agencies interpret unsafe or unsound banking practices in the context of
enforcement actions, rulemakings, and published agency guidelines. In the
enforcement context, the agencies appear to be testing the limits of the safety
and soundness definition. More important, the agencies' rulemaking and
published guidelines provide some clues as to how the agencies view safety
and soundness as a basis for director liability.
1. Interpretation of Unsafe or Unsound in Enforcement Actions
In addition to the evidence that the agencies have strayed from the few
circuit court decisions that limit the breadth of the unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices,'2 there is some proof that the agencies have sought to expand
the already-broad definition adopted by the courts. For example, citing the
language "which might result in abnormal risk or loss" from the judicially
adopted definitions,129 the OCC has indicated that the demonstration of ac-
tual loss is not an element of proof in establishing the existence of an unsafe
or unsound banking practice.
130
Moreover, some evidence suggests that the agencies may be advocating
a slightly different definition of unsafe or unsound banking practices-one
that is arguably broader than the judicially adopted definition. Recall that
the judicially adopted definition targets conduct that "might result in abnor-
mal risk or loss.'' Some administrative orders depart from the "abnormal
126 This approach is consistent with the FISA's legislative history. See supra notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The agencies receive also a "high degree" of
deference on the finding of an unsafe or unsound banking practice. This type of deference re-
lates to the application of safety and soundness principles through formal enforcement and is
discussed in Part III of this Article.
128 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing agencies' rejection of the Fifth
Circuit's Gulf Federal limitation).
129 See supra text accompanying note 91.
130 First Nat'l Bank & Trust, OCC AA-EC-88-16, 1991 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 293, at *41
(Oct. 31, 1991); First Nat'l Bank of *** ***, ***, OCC AA-EC-87-106, 1988 OCC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 23, at *10 (Nov. 14, 1988).
131 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
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risk or loss" language and replace it with "unacceptable risk of loss or dam-
age,' 32 "undue risk,"'1 33 "unnecessary risk,"'134 or any risk "other than those
inherent in doing business, whether in a bank or elsewhere.' 135
The language "undue risk of loss" has been criticized as substituting a
subjective determination of "undue risk" for the "abnormal risk" standard
that Congress intended and that the courts adopted. 36 Presumably, this ob-
jection is based on the premise that the language "abnormal risk" prescribes
an objective determination of risk. Yet, it is unclear whether any of these
terms (abnormal, unacceptable, undue, unnecessary, or unusual) prescribe
either a purely objective or subjective analysis.137
2. Interpretation of Unsafe or Unsound in Rulemaking
From time to time, the agencies have described certain activities that
they deem to be unsafe or unsound.138 At the same time, they have asserted
consistently that the existence of these regulations does not limit their ability
to assert that other activities are also unsafe or unsound.139 This Subsection
discusses the most recent and significant agency rulemaking that defines
safety and soundness, focusing on the recent proposed rulemaking that pro-
vides for the congressionally mandated safety and soundness standards in
several important areas of bank operations.
With the passage of FDICIA in 1991, Congress provided the banking
agencies with new powers designed to prevent problems in banks' operations
or, at a minimum, to resolve problems at the least cost to the deposit insur-
ance fund.14 These new powers operate on what has been described as a
"tripwire" system,' 41 which allows the agencies to take various forms of
132 See, e.g., Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP No. 92-24, 1 9 (Mar. 11, 1992) (order to cease and
desist for affirmative relief from Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler).
133 See, e.g., Tarrant Bank, FDIC-91-38a, 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 370, at *7 (Aug. 17,
1993).
134 See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Clovis, FDIC-91-406b, 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 303, at
*4 (Dec. 7, 1993).
135 Fisher, supra note 86, at 66. The Fed's use of this definition is described by the attorney
who argued the case before the D.C. Circuit as one that essentially prohibited "unusual business
practices." Id. The court, however, did not reach this issue. Id. at 66 & n.82.
136 Id. at 53.
137 As a practical matter, the determination of risk is bound to be a mixed subjective/objec-
tive assessment in which agency examiners utilize both their personal judgment (subjective ele-
ment) and their knowledge of industry practices (objective element) to determine the level of
acceptable risk.
138 The agencies have promulgated some regulations defining certain unsafe or unsound
banking practices. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1994) (Fed); 12 C.F.R. §§ 337.1-.11 (1994)
(FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(a) (1994) (OTS).
139 See 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(c) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 337.11 (1994).
140 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a) (Supp. V 1993).
141 Baxter, supra note 18, at 516-28 (detailing the FDICIA tripwire system).
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action once an institution fails to meet defined capital' 42 and safety and
soundness standards.
143
Section 132 of FDICIA created a new section 39 of the FDIA144 and
requires each federal banking agency to adopt regulations prescribing
standards for safety and soundness in three areas: (1) operations and man-
agement, 45 (2) asset quality, earnings, and stock valuation, 46 and (3) em-
ployee compensation. 47 If the "appropriate Federal banking agency"
142 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. V 1993). Of particular significance to bank directors is the
provision that allows for the dismissal of directors if the bank is "undercapitalized" and fails to
submit or implement a capital restoration plan acceptable to the agency. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
143 See infra notes 144-160 and accompanying text.
144 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
sec. 132, § 39, 105 Stat. 2236, 2267-70 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (Supp. V 1993)).
145 As codified, § 39(a) of the FDIA provides:
Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall, for all insured depository insti-
tutions and depository institution holding companies, prescribe-
(1) standards relating to-
(A) internal controls, information systems, and internal audit systems, in
accordance with section 1831m of this title;
(B) loan documentation;
(C) credit underwriting;
(D) interest rate exposure;
(E) asset growth; and
(F) compensation, fees, and benefits, in accordance with subsection (c) of
this section; and
(2) such other operational and managerial standards as the agency determines
to be appropriate.
12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(a) (Supp. V 1993).
146 As codified, § 39(b) of the FDIA provides:
Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall, for all insured depository insti-
tutions and depository institution holding companies, prescribe-
(1) standards specifying-
(A) a maximum ratio of classified assets to capital;
(B) minimum earnings sufficient to absorb losses without impairing capi-
tal; and
(C) to the extent feasible, a minimum ratio of market value to book value
for publicly traded shares of the institution or company; and
(2) such other standards relating to asset quality, earnings, and valuation as
the agency determines to be appropriate.
12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(b) (Supp. V 1993).
147 As codified, § 39(c) of the FDIA provides:
Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall, for all insured depository insti-
tutions, prescribe-
(1) standards prohibiting as an unsafe and unsound practice any employment
contract, compensation or benefit agreement, fee arrangement, perquisite, stock
option plan, postemployment benefit, or other compensatory arrangement that-
(A) would provide any executive officer, employee, director, or principal
shareholder of the institution with excessive compensation, fees or benefits; or
(B) could lead to material financial loss to the institution;
(2) standards specifying when compensation, fees, or benefits referred to in
paragraph (1) are excessive, which shall require the agency to determine whether
the amounts are unreasonable or disproportionate to the services actually per-
formed by the individual by considering-
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("AFBA") 14s determines that an insured depository institution has failed to
meet the prescribed standards, the AFBA will require the institution to sub-
mit an acceptable plan specifying the steps that the institution will take to
correct the deficiency. 49 If the institution fails to submit an acceptable plan,
or materially fails to implement a plan accepted by AFBA, the AFBA must
require the institution to correct the deficiency and may take supervisory ac-
tion against the institution.150
Section 39 of the FDIA is intended not to restrict, but rather to augment,
any existing authority of the federal banking authorities.15 1 Section 39, there-
fore, does not necessarily affect the formal enforcement powers of the agen-
cies. Nevertheless, these standards should serve as general guidance to the
agencies and directors for safe and sound banking practices.
In July 1992, the federal banking agencies published a Joint Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("ANPR") requesting comments on the is-
sues raised by section 39.152 The ANPR set forth the agencies' concerns with
regard to these standards:
The overriding issue facing the agencies in adopting regulations pur-
suant to section 39 of the [FDIA] is how to balance the objectives of
the statute relating to safety and soundness standards with the im-
portant need to avoid establishing unrealistic and overly burden-
some standards that unnecessarily raise costs within the regulated
community. In light of the need to attract and retain capital and
management talent in the banking and thrift industries, it is impor-
tant that the standards not needlessly impose uncertainty or raise
(A) the combined value of all cash and noncash benefits provided to the
individual;
(B) the compensation history of the individual and other individuals with
comparable expertise at the institution;
(C) the financial condition of the institution;
(D) comparable compensation practices at comparable institutions, based
upon such factors as asset size, geographic location, and the complexity of the
loan portfolio or other assets;
(E) for postemployment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to
the institution;
(F) any connection between the individual and any fraudulent act or
omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to the
institution; and
(G) other factors that the agency determines to be relevant; and
(3) such other standards relating to compensation, fees, and benefits as the
agency determines to be appropriate.
12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(c) (Supp. V 1993).
148 The "appropriate Federal banking agency" for a national bank is the OCC; for a state
member insured bank, it is the Fed; for a state nonmember insured bank, it is the FDIC; and for
a savings institution, it is the OTS. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (Supp. V 1993).
149 FDIA § 39(e)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
150 FDIA § 39(e)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
151 FDIA § 39(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(g) (Supp. V 1993).




substantive issues with respect to their implementation by the agen-
des going forward.15
3
The agencies received over 400 comments and published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking ("NPR") in November 1993.154 The NPR reported
that commenters strongly preferred general, rather than specific, standards
"to avoid regulatory micromanagement of the banking and thrift indus-
tries.' 155 To a great extent, the agencies accepted this advice and adopted
general standards that "establish the ends that proper operations and man-
agement shall achieve, while leaving the means to each institution."'1 56 The
proposed standards contain objective criteria with regard to the asset quality
and earnings standards. 157 In the area most essential to the duties of bank
officers and directors-the operational and managerial standards-however,
the proposed standards focus on the content of the banks' procedures.158
153 Id. at 31,337.
154 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,802, 60,803 (1993) (proposed Nov. 18,
1993).
155 Id. The majority of the comments came from banks. Id.
156 Id. Professor Baxter, however, warns that the proposed standards' lack of specificity is
potentially detrimental to the banking industry:
[T]he generality of these proposed rules, while making the best of a bad situation in
the short term, create long-term traps for industry participants insofar as they de-
pend, for their sensible implementation, on agencies that are not subject to the
pressure of a Congress that may one day need to react again to a banking crisis
such as the one we have just experienced.
Baxter, supra note 89, at 210.
157 For example, highlights of the proposed asset quality and earnings standards for the
OCC include:
(a) Maximum ratio of classified assets to capital-
(1) In general A national bank shall maintain a ratio of classified assets to
total capital and ineligible allowances that is no greater than 1.0.
(b) Minimum earnings sufficient to absorb losses without impairing capital...
A national bank's earnings are sufficient to absorb losses without impairing capital
ifi
(1) The national bank is in compliance with the minimum capital requirements
... ;and
(2) The national bank would, if its net income or loss over the last four
quarters of earnings continued over the next four quarters, remain in compliance
with minimum capital requirements.
58 Fed. Reg. 60,802, 60,810-11 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 30.4).
158 For example, highlights of the proposed operational and managerial standards for the
OCC include:
(a) Internal controls and information systems. A national bank shall have in-
ternal controls and information systems that are appropriate to the size of the bank
and the nature and scope of its activities, and that provide for:
(1) An organizational structure that establishes clear lines of authority and
responsibility for monitoring adherence to prescribed policies;
(b) Internal audit system. A national bank shall have an internal audit system
that is appropriate to the size of the bank and the nature and scope of its activities,
and that provides for.
(5) Verification and review of management actions to address identified weak-
nesses; and
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This part of the proposal references, inter alia, internal controls, information
systems, internal audit systems, and loan documentation practices.
Although the eventual adoption of the proposed standards does not nec-
essarily affect enforcement against bank directors based on safety and sound-
ness principles, 159 the operational and managerial standards provide a clue as
to how the agencies view the role of management in ensuring banks' safety
and soundness. Not unlike the courts that have applied the business judg-
ment rule in assessing the conduct of directors, the agencies seem to focus
(6) Review by the national bank's audit committee or board of directors of the
effectiveness of the internal audit system.
(c) Loan documentation. A national bank shall establish and maintain loan
documentation practices that:
(1) Enable the national bank to make an informed lending decision and to
assess risk as necessary on an ongoing basis;
(5) Take account of the size and complexity of a loan;
(d) Credit underwriting. A national bank shall establish and maintain prudent
credit underwriting practices that:
(1) Are commensurate with the types of loans the national bank will make
(4) Establish a system of independent, ongoing credit review with appropriate
communication to management and to the board of directors;
(e) Interest rate exposure. A national bank shall:
(1) Manage interest rate risk in a manner that is appropriate to the size of the
national bank and the complexity of its assets and liabilities;
(2) Provide for periodic reporting to management and the board of directors
regarding interest rate risk;
(f) Asset growth. A national bank's asset growth shall be based on a plan that:
(1) Reflects consideration of:
(i) The source, volatility and use of the funds that support asset growth;
(ii) Any increase in credit risk or interest rate risk as a result of growth; and
(iii) The effect of growth on the national bank's capital;
(g) Compensation, fees and benefits. A national bank shall maintain safe-
guards to prevent the payment of compensation, fees and benefits that are exces-
sive or could lead to material financial loss to the national bank, in accordance with
§ 30.5 of this part.
58 Fed. Reg. 60,802, 60,810 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 30.3).
159 The agencies have indicated that their formal enforcement efforts would remain un-
changed by § 39 and the proposed regulations. The NPR states also that the proposed regula-
tions change no existing agency policies. See 58 Fed. Reg. 60,802, 60,803 (1993). Moreover,
these proposed regulations contain the familiar "savings clause" that reaffirms the gap-filler sta-
tus of unsafe or unsound banking practices. The notice states:
Compliance with the standards required by section 39 would not preclude a
finding that an institution is engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice or is in an
unsafe or unsound condition. Accordingly, supervisory action may be taken
against an institution or company that has not been cited for a deficiency under
section 39.




their attention on the development of procedures governing banks' opera-
tions, rather than mandating particular modes of operation.160
3. Interpretation of Unsafe or Unsound in Agency Guidelines for
Director Liability
In late 1992, both the FDIC and the OTS issued guidelines regarding the
duties of bank officers and directors. These guidelines focus primarily on the
duties of care and loyalty but mention also the principles of safety and sound-
ness. Both sets of guidelines contain the following language articulating the
duty of care:
The duty of care requires directors and officers to act as pru-
dent and diligent business persons in conducting the affairs of the
[institution/bank].
This means that directors are responsible for selecting, moni-
toring, and evaluating competent management; establishing busi-
ness strategies and policies; monitoring and assessing the progress
of business operations; establishing and monitoring adherence to
policies and procedures required by statute, regulation, and princi-
ples of safety and soundness; and for making business decisions on
the basis of fully informed and meaningful deliberation.'
61
This language is illuminating for two reasons. First, it evidences the
agencies' endorsement of the concepts underlying the business judgment rule
by focusing on the directors' duties in the process of running the bank (i.e.,
hiring competent managers and instituting policies and procedures). 62 Sec-
ond, it provides some indication of the agencies' view of where safety and
soundness fits within a director's duties: the phrase "principles of safety and
soundness" appears within the description of a director's fiduciary duty of
care. The agencies indicate that to discharge their duty of care, directors
must develop procedures to ensure that their institutions adhere to laws, reg-
ulations, and principles of safety and soundness. This language suggests that
the agencies view the adherence to principles of safety and soundness as part
of directors' fiduciary duty of care.' 63
E. Summary
Taking together congressional intent and court and agency interpreta-
tions (and bearing in mind that the agencies may be advocating a broader
definition), the definition of unsafe or unsound banking practices includes
160 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161 Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Directors and Officers of Insured Deposi-
tory Institutions, OTS 92-163 (Nov. 16,1992) (emphasis added); New FDIC Guidelines Issued to
Clarify the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and Officers, FDIC FIL-87-92 (Dec. 17, 1992)
(emphasis added).
162 See supra note 65 (discussing the agencies' statements supporting the business judgment
rule).
163 See also infra notes 198-199 and accompanying text (discussing the agencies' tendency
to link unsafe or unsound banking practices and breach of fiduciary duties in formal enforce-
ment actions against directors).
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the following elements: (1) conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards
of banking operations, and (2) conduct that might result in abnormal risk or
loss to a banking institution. The second element requires a showing that the
conduct involves at least a potential risk to the bank's solvency. When safety
and soundness is viewed in the context of director conduct, evidence suggests
that the agencies view the principle as part of a director's fiduciary duty of
care.
II. Directors' Safety and Soundness Duty: Application of Unsafe
or Unsound Banking Practices as a Basis of Bank
Director Liability
Part II of this Article focused on developing a definition of unsafe or
unsound banking practices. This Part examines the application of the prin-
ciple of safety and soundness to the conduct of bank directors. It provides an
overview of the statutory foundation for formal enforcement powers based
on unsafe or unsound banking practices and highlights the out-of-pocket
losses to directors that may result from the exercise of those powers. This
Part also catalogs the factual scenarios that typically give rise to formal en-
forcement actions against directors for violations of safety and soundness.
A. Statutory Basis for Formal Enforcement Powers Based on Unsafe or
Unsound Banking Practices
Unsafe or unsound banking practices serve as a basis for director liabil-
ity under each of the most important formal enforcement provisions: cease
and desist orders,164 civil money penalties, 165 and removal and prohibition.
166
This is not new; unsafe or unsound banking practices have served as a basis
for director liability since as early as 1933.167 This Section discusses the statu-
tory foundation supporting unsafe or unsound banking practices as a basis for
each of these formal enforcement proceedings.
The FDIA168 subjects bank directors to the formal enforcement powers
of the federal banking agencies. Under the FDIA, the AFBA 169 has the
power to bring various formal enforcement actions against bank directors. 70
The FDIA provides the AFBA with authority to issue a cease and desist or-
der 171 against a bank director if, in the opinion of the AFBA, the director is
164 See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
166 See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 42. FIRREA significantly amended the FDIA and expanded the en-
forcement powers of the federal banking agencies. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 148.
170 A bank director is brought under the scope of the various enforcement provisions as an
"institution-affiliated party," which includes directors, officers, shareholders, and other profes-
sionals (including attorneys). 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (Supp. V 1993). The formal enforcement ac-
tions described infra notes 171-180 and accompanying text can be brought against any
institution-affiliated parties and against the bank itself.
171 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (Supp. V 1993). The issuance of the order is preceded by ser-
vice of a notice of charges and a hearing. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1).
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engaging, has engaged, or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practice.172 The AFBA's cease and desist power includes the authority to
require directors to make restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnifica-
tion, or guarantee against loss if the director was unjustly enriched or acted in
reckless disregard of the law.173
A bank director confronts potential liability for three tiers of civil money
penalties.174 The first-tier penalty may reach up to $5,000 for each day the
violation continues, the second-tier penalty may be up to $25,000 per day,
and the third-tier penalty may be up to a staggering $1,000,000 per day.175
The first tier is likely the most potent source of director liability. It includes
none of the standards of culpability required in the other two tiers.176
Although unsafe or unsound banking practices do not serve directly as a ba-
sis for the first-tier civil money penalty,177 directors can be subject to first-tier
penalties if they engage in unsafe or unsound banking practices and then
violate the terms of a cease and desist order issued in response to such
practices.1
78
A bank director is liable for a second-tier civil money penalty of up to
$25,000 per day for recklessly engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice if
such practice (1) is part of a pattern of misconduct, (2) causes or is likely to
cause more than minimal loss to the bank, or (3) results in pecuniary gain or
other benefit to the director.179 Third-tier civil money penalties of up to
$1,000,000 per day may be imposed on a director who knowingly engages in
any unsafe or unsound practice and either knowingly or recklessly causes a
substantial loss to the bank or receives a substantial pecuniary gain or other
benefit by reason of such practice.180
172 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Violations of law or regulation also serve as
a basis for the cease and desist authority. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1). With the passage of FIRREA
in 1989, cease and desist orders became a matter of public record. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u).
173 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
174 12 U.S.C § 1818(i)(2) (Supp. V 1993). An agency hearing is available if the director
requests a hearing within 20 days after notice of the penalty. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(H).
175 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. V 1993).
176 See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements
for second-tier and third-tier civil money penalties).
177 The first-tier civil money penalty may be assessed for a violation of any law, regulation,
or any provision imposed by a cease and desist order. The penalty is up to "$5,000 for each day
during which such violation continues." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
178 A violation of any final order issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (cease and desist
provisions) serves as a basis for first-tier civil money penalty. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)(ii)
(Supp. V 1993). There is no requirement of a finding that the violation of the final order was
intentional, knowing, reckless, or even negligent.
179 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Breach of the director's fiduciary duty serves
also as a basis for a second-tier civil money penalty if the breach is part of a pattern of miscon-
duct, causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss to the bank, or results in a pecuniary
gain or other benefit to the director. Id.
180 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993). A director may also be subject to a third-tier
civil money penalty for knowingly breaching any fiduciary duty and either knowingly or reck-
lessly causing a substantial loss to the bank or a substantial pecuniary gain or benefit to the
director by reason of breach. Id.
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Finally, the agencies' enforcement powers include the authority to re-
move a bank director from office and to prohibit the director from participa-
ting in the affairs of the bank, if the AFBA determines that (1) the director
engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound practice; and (2) by reason
of such practice, the bank suffered or will probably suffer financial loss or
other damage, or the interests of the bank's depositors have been or could be
prejudiced, or the director has received financial gain or other benefit; and
(3) the practice involved personal dishonesty or demonstrated willful or con-
tinuing disregard by the director for the safety or soundness of the bank.181
Directors may appeal the exercise of these agency enforcement powers
to the appropriate United States court of appeals.182 This appellate review is
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 183 which provides
that agency action will be reversed only upon a court's finding that the action
was not supported by substantial evidence or is otherwise arbitrary and capri-
cious.184 Directors seeking recourse in appellate courts face an uphill battle
given the deference enjoyed by the regulators under the APA.
B. Directors' Monetary Exposure in Formal Enforcement Actions
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the agencies' exercise of
their formal enforcement powers can lead to the imposition of both monetary
damages (authorized as part of the agencies' cease and desist powers) and
civil money penalties. 185 Despite the existence of insurance policies and cor-
porate indemnification, directors may be required to pay these damages and
penalties out of their own pockets.
Directors' and officers' liability insurance policies often include a "regu-
latory exclusion" clause that excludes from coverage any actions brought by
the banking regulators. 8 6 Because these exclusionary clauses have been gen-
erally enforced, 187 directors are not likely to be insured against personal
monetary liability stemming from formal enforcement actions.
181 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The statute provides for notice and hearing
before removal. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(4). A director who is subject to a removal or prohibition
order is also prohibited from participating in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository
institution unless the director receives written consent from the agencies. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)(7)(A)-(B).
182 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h) (Supp. V 1993).
183 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
184 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988); see Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580, 1584 (11th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) in reviewing FDIC enforcement action); First
Nat'l Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) in reviewing OCC enforcement action); see also First Nat'l
Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[t]he [OCC] has
wide discretion in the field of national banking and the exercise of [its] discretion will not be
disturbed except when the exercise is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law").
185 See supra notes 171-180 and accompanying text.
186 Not only do the "regulatory exclusion" clauses exclude coverage for formal enforce-
ment actions brought by the regulators, but they also exclude insurance coverage in receivership
cases brought by the FDIC and RTC.
187 See, eg., FDIC v. American Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 471,472-73 (4th Cir.), amended, No.
92-1447 (4th Cir. May 6, 1993); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (5th
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Most banks, through their charters or by contract, offer indemnification
to their officers and directors for all losses and expenses incurred by reason
of their service. Corporate indemnification may prove useless in receivership
actions (because the bank is insolvent). If a bank is solvent, corporate in-
demnification may be available to satisfy damage awards and civil money
penalties.188 FDIA section 1828(k), however, provides the FDIC with the
authority to prohibit or limit indemnification payments. 189 As part of their
negotiated settlements of formal enforcement actions, agencies often prohibit
indemnification of civil money penalties and expenses.190 Accordingly, the
usefulness of corporate indemnification to directors is limited.
C. Formal Enforcement Actions Against Directors for Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practices
1. Examiners' Roles in the Formal Enforcement Process
The process that eventually leads to a formal enforcement action against
a director begins with the appropriate agency's safety and soundness exami-
nation of the bank. Agency examiners play an important role in this process.
They determine whether the bank or its institution-affiliated parties have
committed unsafe or unsound banking practices.191 These same examiners
may later serve as expert witnesses in administrative proceedings.192 More-
over, when reviewing loan classifications, courts, administrative law judges,
and the agencies (in their adjudicative role) defer to the examiners' determi-
nation.193 In reviewing agency decisions, courts must defer to the decision of
the agency unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is otherwise
arbitrary and capricious.194
Cir. 1992); FDIC v. American Casualty Co., 975 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 701-03 (8th Cir. 1992).
188 See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1994); MODEL BusiNss CORP. Acr
§ 8.51 (1991).
189 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k) (Supp. V 1993).
190 Se e.g., Thomas P. Dolphin, No. FDIC-92-223k (June 17, 1993), available in
WESTLAW, FFIN-FDIC Database; Roswell J. Atkinson, No. FDIC-92-11k, 1993 FDIC Enf.
Dec. LEXIS 224 (May 6, 1993); Patrick Roche, in 4 FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND OR-
DERS 10,589 (Arthur L. Beamon & Nancy L. Alper eds., Supp. 1992); Scott A. Noyes, Nos. 93-
059-CMP-I, 93-059-B-I, slip op. at 3 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. May 23, 1994);
Robert J. Ziton, No. 93-056-CMP-I, slip op. at 3 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
Sept. 24, 1993); C.M. Newton, Jr., No. 90-027-CMP-I1, slip op. at 3 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. Oct. 24, 1990); Southwest Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 119, 1990 OCC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 65, at *1-*2 (Oct. 5, 1990).
191 See supra note 170.
192 Courts have held that bank examiners may serve as expert witnesses in administrative
proceedings on the issue of what constitutes unsafe or unsound practices. See Sunshine State
Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580, 1583 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); First Nat'l Bank of Eden v.
Department of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
193 Se4 eg., FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[F]act-finding agencies
must accord some deference to their initial fact-finders or they would waste their limited re-
sources forever reinventing the wheel."); Sunshine State Bank, 783 F.2d at 1584 (concluding that
deference to the conclusions of examiners is appropriate "[u]nless shown to be arbitrary or ca-
pricious or outside a zone of reasonableness").
194 See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text (discussing deference to agency
decisions).
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With these layers of deference as a backdrop, the next two Sections dis-
cuss common categories of cases in which unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices give rise to formal enforcement actions against bank directors.195 The
first category includes those cases in which the bank's unsafe or unsound
banking practices are the basis for a cease and desist order that is binding
against the bank and its institution-affiliated parties. The second category
includes cases in which the directors' conduct forms the basis for formal en-
forcement actions.
2. Actions Based Upon Banks' Practices
Although the scope of this Article is limited to directors' unsafe or un-
sound banking practices, in many cases directors are held indirectly liable for
the banks' unsafe or unsound banking practices. Because these cases do not
name individual directors as respondents, they do not typically include spe-
cific findings relating to individual directors' conduct. It is appropriate, then,
that the liability of directors in this class of cases be limited to the imposition
of a cease and desist order that is binding on the bank and all institution-
affiliated parties.
These cases involve most often a laundry list of practices that constitute
unsafe or unsound banking practices. In a recent typical enforcement action,
the FDIC found that the bank had engaged in the following unsafe or un-
sound banking practices: operating the bank with an excessive volume of
adversely classified loans; engaging in hazardous lending and lax collection
practices; operating with unsatisfactory earnings; and failing to have an ade-
quate allowance for loan and lease losses. 196 Although this action did not
name officers or directors as respondents, the unsafe or unsound banking
practices identified included operating with poor management. 197
195 The information in the next Subsection should be considered with three points in mind.
First, the information contained therein is derived primarily from adjudicated cases because such
cases tend to have more complete and formal records. Because the vast majority of formal
enforcement actions are settled, this Subsection provides only some indication of how the agen-
cies apply unsafe or unsound banking practices; it cannot give the complete picture. Second, my
research focused on directors as respondents in formal enforcement actions. Because in most of
these cases respondents were both directors and officers and because the FDIA treats officers
and directors alike for purposes of their liability in formal enforcement actions (as both are
institution-affiliated parties), these cases do not typically distinguish between the respondent's
conduct as an officer and the respondent's conduct as a director. Third, most safety and sound-
ness cases involve allegations of violations of law or regulation as well as unsafe or unsound
banking practices. Therefore, the conduct giving rise to an unsafe or unsound banking practice
may give rise also to a violation of law or regulation. Cases in which the only basis for the unsafe
or unsound banking practices is a violation of law or regulation, however, have been excluded.
196 Bay Bank & Trust Co., No. FDIC-92-313b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 112, at *2
(Apr. 5, 1994). For recommended decisions and orders involving similar unsafe or unsound
banking practices, see Citizens Bank of Clovis, No. FDIC-91-406b, 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS
304, at *46-*48 (July 27, 1993) and 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 303, at *9-*10 (Dec. 7, 1993),
American Bank of the South, No. FDIC-92-17b, 1992 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 512, at *20-*30
(Nov. 24, 1992) and 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 83, at *12-*15 (Mar. 30, 1993), Mansfield Bank
& Trust Co., No. FDIC-90-44b, 1990 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 1, at *18-*20 (Nov. 16, 1990) and
1991 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 18, at *1-*2 (Mar. 12, 1991), and *** Nat'l Bank ***, **, No. AA-
EC-87-123, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 21, at *10-11 (Jan. 12, 1989).
197 Bay Bank & Trust Co., No. FDIC-92-313b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 112, at *2
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3. Actions Based Upon Directors' Conduct
In those cases in which the directors are respondents, examples of the
conduct that may involve unsafe or unsound banking practices include trans-
actions with affiliates; failure to disclose conflicts of interest to other board
members; compensation practices; other self-dealing transactions; and trans-
actions leading to false bank records. These practices often give rise also to a
finding that the directors breached their fiduciary duty to the bank. 98 This
comes as no surprise as these practices often resemble cases involving a re-
view of business judgments (governed by the fiduciary duty of care) or trans-
actions involving self-dealing (governed by the fiduciary duty of loyalty).199
The OTS recently issued a Notice of Charges in a case alleging that a
director's involvement in certain transactions with bank affiliates was an un-
safe or unsound banking practice and a breach of his fiduciary duties.2o The
OTS charges that the respondent, the former director of American Savings
and Loan Association of Florida ("American"), failed to take steps to protect
the interests of American in the implementation of a collateral substitution
(Apr. 5, 1994). Findings of poor management practices are often coupled with a finding that the
board of directors failed to provide adequate supervision over the bank's managers. See Citizens
Bank of Clovis, No. FDIC-91-406b, 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 304, at *47-*48 (July 27, 1993)
and 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 303, at *10 (Dec. 7, 1993); American Bank of the South, No.
FDIC-92-17b, 1992 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 512, at *35 (Nov. 24,1992) and 1993 FDIC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 83, at *13 (Mar. 30 1993); Mansfield Bank & Trust Co., No. FDIC-90-44b, 1990 FDIC
Enf. Dec. LEXIS 1, at *19 (Nov. 16, 1990) and 1991 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 18, at *1-*2 (Mar.
12, 1991); *** Nat'l Bank * * No. AA-EC-87-123, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 21, at *10
(Jan. 12, 1989).
198 For examples of cases in which the same activity gave rise to both a finding of unsafe or
unsound banking practices and a breach of fiduciary duty, see Simpson v. OTS, 29 F.3d 1418,
1425-26 (9th Cir. 1994), Jameson v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), Rich-
ard M. Roberson, No. FDIC-92-122e, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 47, at *5 (Feb. 22, 1994), ***
An Officer and Director of *** Bank of ***, in 1 FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECIsIoNS AND ORDERS
J 5041, at A-374 (Arthur L. Beamon & Nancy L. Alper eds., Supp. 1992), James L. Magee, No.
91-024-E I1, reprinted in 78 FED. RESERVE BULL 968, 970 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys. Dec. 1992), A. Frederick Greenberg, No. OCC AA-EC-90-45, 1991 OCC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 511 (Oct. 28,1991) (Decision and Order), aff'd, Greenberg v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1992), and Neil M. Bush, No. ERC-90-30, 1991 OTS
LEXIS 94 (Apr. 18, 1991) (Decision and Order).
199 Many of the adjudicated cases against directors involve facts relating to a director's duty
of loyalty. See supra note 27 (discussing the duty of loyalty). One reason for this is that the
statutory provisions providing for many of the formal enforcement powers require findings of
culpability that relate to the duty of loyalty apart from the finding of unsafe or unsound banking
practices. For example, if an agency brings a removal action against a director based on a finding
of an unsafe or unsound banking practice, the agency must find also that the practice involved
"personal dishonesty" or "demonstrate[d] willful or continuing disregard by [the director] for
the safety or soundness" of the bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). A finding of
"personal dishonesty" likely would involve self-dealing that would constitute a breach of the
duty of loyalty. Similarly, if an agency seeks restitution from a director based on unsafe or
unsound banking practices, the agency must find also that the director was enriched unjustly or
that the practice involved reckless disregard for the law. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) (Supp. V
1993). A finding of "unjust enrichment" likely would involve a breach of the duty of loyalty. By
contrast, the agencies' cease and desist power can be used against a director solely on a finding
of unsafe or unsound banking practices. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
200 Donald M. Kaplan, OTS Order No. AP 94-11, slip op. at 13-15 (Mar. 11, 1994) (Notice
of Charges). At the time this Article went to press, this matter remained unadjudicated.
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plan.201 American was owned by Enstar Group, Inc. ("Enstar"), a savings
and loan holding company that also owned Enstar Specialty Retail, Inc.
("Enstar Retail"). Under the collateral substitution plan, the common stock
of Enstar Retail was pledged to American in exchange for cash generated by
the sale of junk bonds securing a $209,258,795 note held by American.202
Because the respondent attended the meeting in which Enstar approved
the plan, the Notice alleges that the respondent knew that the collateral sub-
stitution plan posed an abnormal risk of loss to American and that the re-
spondent failed to take steps to protect American's interests (e.g., he failed to
advise, or seek approval from, American's board of directors regarding the
plan).203 The OTS alleges that this conduct constitutes an unsafe or unsound
banking practice as well as a breach of fiduciary duty.204 The OTS notice
asks for restitution in the amount of $18,333,180 plus interest and seeks to
prohibit the respondent from participating in the affairs of any bank.205
One highly publicized action provides an excellent example of a situa-
tion in which a breach of fiduciary duty (involving conflicts of interest)
served as a basis for a finding of an unsafe or unsound banking practice. In
Neil M. Bush, the OTS found that savings and loan director Neil M. Bush,
son of then-President George Bush, had engaged in an unsafe or unsound
banking practice by breaching his fiduciary duty to Silverado Banking, Sav-
ings and Loan Association.206 The OTS found that Mr. Bush failed to dis-
close his financial interest to other board members in certain loan and real
estate transactions being considered by the Silverado board. 207
In reaching its decision, the OTS applied a two-prong definition of safety
and soundness. First, the OTS considered whether the conduct was contrary
to generally accepted standards of prudent operation of a financial institu-
tion. The OTS concluded that a breach of fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
a conflict of interest is clearly contrary to those standards.208 Second, the
OTS considered whether the conduct, if continued, might be an abnormal
risk or loss or damage to the institution, its shareholders, or the insurance
fund. It concluded that by breaching his fiduciary duty, Bush had exposed
the savings and loan to the possibility of abnormal risk because his conduct
had "impaired the decision-making process of the board [of directors]." 209
201 Id. at 4, 9-13.
202 Id. at 6-8. Junk bonds are high-yield, noninvestment-grade bonds. Franklin Say. Ass'n
v. Director, OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. dedied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
203 Kaplan, No. AP 94-11, slip op. at 9-13.
204 Id. at 13-15. The Notice of Charges also includes allegations that Kaplan violated cer-
tain laws and regulations. Id. at 13.
205 Id. at 15.
206 Neil M. Bush, No. ERC-90-30,1991 OTS LEXIS 94, at *4 (Apr. 18,1991) (Decision and
Order).
207 Id. at *2-*3.
208 Id. at *35-*36.
209 Id. at *36. For a similar case, see A. Frederick Greenberg, No. OCC AA-EC-90-45,
1991 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 511, at *79 (Oct. 28, 1991) (Decision and Order) ("[L]oans to
insiders, affiliates, and related entities are unsafe and unsound where full disclosure of the inter-
est of the related parties and the use of the proceeds is not made and where those with potential
benefit do not recuse themselves from voting."), aff'd, Greenberg v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 1992).
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The agencies have not always been successful in asserting conflicts of
interest as a basis for a finding of unsafe or unsound banking practices. In In
re Seidman, the Third Circuit reversed a finding by the OTS that a director's
conflicts of interest constituted an unsafe or unsound banking practice. 210
Seidman was the chairman of the board at Crestmont Federal Savings and
Loan ("Crestmont"). The OTS alleged, inter alia, that Seidman had engaged
in unsafe or unsound banking practices by using his position at Crestmont to
obtain a release from his personal guaranty of a loan made by another finan-
cial institution to Fulton Street Associates ("FSA").211 FSA was a real estate
partnership formed by Seidman and several others to purchase and develop
industrial condominiums. FSA was interested in negotiating end-user financ-
ing with Crestmont. 212 Seidman believed he would have to relinquish his in-
terests in FSA for Crestmont to consider end-user loans; therefore, he sought
a release of his personal guaranty of FSA's loan obligations and withdrew
from FSA.213 Although Crestmont never made any end-user loans, the Di-
rector of the OTS concluded that Seidman's pursuit of a release from his
personal guaranty was an unsafe or unsound banking practice.214 The Third
Circuit found that the record did not support the conclusion that Seidman's
conduct with respect to his personal guaranty was contrary to accepted bank-
ing practices. 215 Alternatively, the court reasoned that even if it were to ac-
cept that Seidman's conduct was imprudent, the OTS had failed to show that
the conduct created an abnormal risk of financial loss to Crestmont. 216
Compensation practices and other payment schemes may also constitute
unsafe or unsound banking practices. For example, in one Ninth Circuit case,
the court reviewed the FDIC's issuance of a cease and desist order that di-
rected Harold A. Hoffman, president of Alaska Continental Bank, to repay
almost $62,000 that he had received in a buyout of his employment contract
with the bank.217 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the FDIC's finding that
given the condition of the bank, this transaction was an unsafe or unsound
banking practice. 8 Rejecting the director's argument that he should have
been allowed to show that the bank was not insolvent at the time of the
payment, the Ninth Circuit stated:
210 In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1994).
211 Id. at 921-22.
212 Id. at 917. The court explained that
[e]nd-user financing permits a person who plans to occupy a unit in a development
to buy the unit or rent it to others. The institution that has financed the project has
a strong interest in facilitating end-user financing because it usually receives a sub-
stantial part of the price the end-user pays, thus reducing its exposure on the loan
to the developer.
Id. at 917 n.4.
213 Id. at 919-20.
214 Id. at 915-16.
215 Id. at 933.
216 Id. The court found, however, that Seidman's attempts to obstruct the OTS's investiga-
tion constituted an unsafe or unsound banking practice. See infra note 222 and accompanying
text.
217 Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 1990).
218 Id. at 1174.
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Whether, as it ultimately turned out, the bank was insolvent or not,
it was most apparent that its assets must be preserved. Given that,
it was hardly prudent to decide that the best thing for [the bank]
and its assets was to buy out [the director's] contract, because he
had decided to abandon a rapidly sinking ship.
219
In addition, other similarly abusive self-dealing transactions, such as
check-kiting schemes,2 0 kickback schemes,221 attempts to obstruct an agency
investigation,2 2 and other payments to third parties for the ultimate benefit
of respondent-directors, 223 constitute unsafe or unsound banking practices.
Finally, the agencies have targeted director conduct affecting the accuracy of
banks' financial statements, such as issuing bank stock in exchange for funds
that have not been received by the bank.224
219 Id. at 1175; see also Simpson v. OTS, 29 F.3d 1418, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
given the institution's financial condition, the president and chairman of the board improperly
distributed profits to himself and other officers and managers); Jameson v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 290,
291 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that a former bank officer improperly falsified bank
records to conceal his bonus from other bank officials); FSLIC v. Bass, 576 F. Supp. 848, 852
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (mem.) (holding that employment agreements providing large bonuses to of-
ficers and directors of a savings and loan were unsafe or unsound banking practices); ***, in 1
FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5003, at A-30 (Arthur L. Beamon & Nancy L.
Alper eds., Supp. 1992) (holding that a payment of a management fee of $276,300, given the
bank's poor condition, was unsafe or unsound); James L. Magee, No. 91-024-E I1, slip op. at 18-
25 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Oct. 5, 1992) (Final Decision and Order) (holding
that a bank director improperly paid himself hundreds of thousands of dollars in excess of salary
and bonus from the bank's miscellaneous expense account); Notice of Assessment of Civil
Money Penalties to Gilbert D. Hill, OCC EA No. 582, 1991 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 345, at *1
(Apr. 16, 1991) (ordering penalties for "unreasonable salaries or other benefits paid to" the
bank's chairman). But see Ernest P. Pettinari, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 89,304, at 82,613 (Nov. 17, 1992) (holding that officers of troubled institution did not
engage in unsafe or unsound banking practices by accepting severance payments deposited in an
escrow account and drawn on the day the bank was closed).
220 See Van Dyke v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 876 F.2d 1377, 1380 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding check-kiting to be an unsafe or unsound banking practice).
221 See Richard M. Roberson, No. FDIC-92-122e, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 47, at *5
(Feb. 22, 1994) (holding former director and executive vice president's receipt of $300,000 in
kickbacks through nominee borrower transactions to be an unsafe or unsound practice).
222 See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1994).
223 See Richard A. Palmer, No. FDIC-90-156c&b, 1991 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 214, at *14
(Sept. 17, 1991) (holding president and director's authorized prepayment of legal fees for his
own benefit when he had notice that the bank was insolvent to be an unsafe or unsound prac-
tice); EVCO, Inc., No. 87-033-CMP-HC, slip op. at 13-18 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. Jan. 26, 1990) (final decision) (holding numerous practices, including payment of consulting
fees to entities related to directors, to be unsafe or unsound).
224 See, e.g., *** Bank and ***, Former Chairman of the Bd. of Directors, *** Bank, in 1
FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5045, at A-439 (Arthur L. Beamon & Nancy L
Alper eds., Supp. 1992); *** Majority Shareholder and Former Chairman of the Bd. of Directors
of *** Bank of ***, in 1 FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5048, at A-478 (Arthur
L Beamon & Nancy L. Alper eds., Supp. 1992).
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IV. Comparison of the Theoretical Foundations for Unsafe or
Unsound Banking Practices and Breach of Fiduciary
Duty of Care
As discussed in Part II, some evidence suggests that the agencies view
principles of safety and soundness as part of a director's fiduciary duties.
Part III indicated that many of the safety and soundness cases brought
against bank directors include claims that directors breached their fiduciary
duties and suggested that the types of cases that give rise to allegations of
unsafe or unsound banking practices give rise also to allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty. To resolve these connections, this Part compares the prin-
ciples of safety and soundness with the principles underlying a director's fidu-
ciary duty of care and concludes that, although the principles are not
equivalent, they are closely related-each having a theoretical basis in negli-
gence theory.
A. Similarities Between Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices and Breach
of Fiduciary Duty
As discussed in Part I, bank directors must exercise ordinary care in the
administration of the affairs of their banks.225 The duty of ordinary care,
sometimes called the fiduciary duty of care,226 has its basis in negligence
theory.227 Negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." In
comparison, unsafe or unsound banking practices means "conduct deemed
contrary to accepted standards of banking operations which might result in
abnormal risk or loss to a banking institution or shareholder."229 These defi-
nitions are similar in that they both refer to conduct that falls below a norma-
tive standard and involves an abnormal or unreasonable risk of harm.
If an unsafe or unsound banking practice is essentially the same as a
failure to exercise ordinary care, directors' unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices must involve some form of negligence-be it simple or gross negligence.
Although the cases involving unsafe or unsound banking practices do not
225 See supra part I.A.
226 See supra note 27 (explaining the confusion surrounding the use of the term
"fiduciary").
227 See supra note 46.
228 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRgs § 282 (1964). The negligence standard established
by law is the "reasonable man" standard. Id. § 283. (One assumes that a Restatement (Third)
will incorporate the "reasonable person" standard-we have come a long way since 1964.)
229 See supra text accompanying note 91.
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necessarily contain a finding of negligence, the facts of the cases would gener-
ally support such a finding.23 0 Accordingly, many of the cases involving di-
rectors' unsafe or unsound banking practices involve also claims that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties.231
B. Differences Between Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices and Breach
of Fiduciary Duty
Although the discussion above emphasizes the similarities between un-
safe or unsound banking practices and the breach of fiduciary duty, the two
concepts are not equivalent. First, in all likelihood, Congress did not intend
to equate unsafe or unsound banking practices with breach of fiduciary
duty232 because a breach of fiduciary duty serves as a separate basis for liabil-
ity for each of the formal enforcement provisions except the cease and desist
230 The same cannot be said for the cases discussed supra part III.C.2, in which directors
were held indirectly liable for the bank's unsafe or unsound banking practices. Such cases typi-
cally involve a laundry list of alleged practices. Although some might support a finding of negli-
gence (e.g., lax lending practices), others might not necessarily support a finding of negligence
(e.g., operating with unsatisfactory earnings). In fact, a finding that a bank is operating with
unsatisfactory earnings does not appear to be focused on conduct. Rather, it appears to describe
the harm that might result from mismanagement of the bank. It is similar to saying that a bro-
ken leg is negligent. A broken leg is not negligent; leaving a banana peel in the middle of the
floor is negligent.
One bank raised a comparable objection in defense of a cease and desist action brought by
the FDIC. *** , in 1 FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5003 (Arthur L. Beamon
& Nancy L. Alper eds., Supp. 1992). The bank contended that the FDIC's notice of charges was
deficient because it alleged unsafe or unsound conditions rather than practices. d. 5003, at A-
28. The Administrative Law Judge hearing the case found "some credence" in the bank's argu-
ment but found that the FDIC had satisfied the statutory notice requirement by alleging facts
constituting the alleged unsafe or unsound practices. Id.
This and similar cases are somewhat disturbing because they impose a type of strict liability
on bank directors and officers. On the other hand, the sanction available in these cases is limited
to the imposition of a cease and desist order. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes
246-251 and accompanying text.
231 See also supra note 198.
232 See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 932 n.30 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that "Congress obviously
thought the concepts were distinct enough to require separate specification in" the law). Note
that Congress's intent is the key to determining the meaning of unsafe or unsound banking
practices, whereas the common law is the source of the interpretation of fiduciary duty. Profes-
sor Baxter illuminated this distinction:
It is important, when noting the flexibility inherent in the "unsafe and un-
sound" concept, to emphasize that this flexibility is not identical to that stemming
from the equitable nature of fiduciary duties. In the case of fiduciary duties, their
content is ultimately determined by a supervising court that, as the exponent of
equitable doctrine, wields the initiative in reaching final determinations concerning
the application of such doctrine in individual cases. In the case of safety/soundness
principles, the primary reference point is the intention of Congress; the question
facing a court is not whether it (the court) regards an action or condition as unsafe
and unsound, but whether the agency, given its statutory authority, has correctly
concluded that it is. The actual limits of agency authority in each case will depend
upon a matrix of legislative prescripts that will usually reflect carefully crafted con-
gressional compromises. Congress frequently prescribes detailed safety/soundness
principles; when an agency imposes requirements that reach beyond these princi-
ples and is struck down by a court on review, the agency must return to Congress to
gain the additional authority it needs. In the case of a fiduciary duty, on the other
[Vol 63:175
Bank Director Liability
power.23 3 For example, if Congress viewed unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tices as equivalent to a breach of fiduciary duty, then Congress would not
have included both principles as bases for the agencies' power to remove
directors from office.2
3 4
Second, not every breach of fiduciary duty constitutes an unsafe or un-
sound banking practice. Recall that the principle of safety and soundness is
intended to protect a bank's financial integrity.23 5 Not all negligent conduct
puts such integrity at risk. For example, if a director is responsible for al-
lowing a bank to make a loan to a borrower who the director knows or
should know is not creditworthy, the bank director's conduct is negligent.23
6
If the conduct poses a potential risk to the bank's financial integrity, then the
conduct quite likely would constitute also an unsafe or unsound banking
practice.23 7 Yet if the loan made was for a nominal sum and was not part of
any pattern of conduct by the director, then the loan would not constitute an
unsafe or unsound banking practice3
8
C. Assessment of the Comparison Between the Unsafe or Unsound
Banking Practices and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Although Congress did not intend directors' unsafe or unsound banking
practices to be equivalent to a breach of fiduciary duty, the two principles
have almost identical theoretical bases, i.e., both principles have negligence-
theory underpinnings. The differences between the two principles, however,
suggest that unsafe or unsound banking practices is in some ways a narrower
and in some ways a broader principle than breach of fiduciary duty.
Because Congress intended the concept of unsafe or unsound banking
practices to address banks' risk of insolvency, the loss that might result from
such practices must relate to that risk.23 9 The same cannot be said for breach
of fiduciary duty: a breach of fiduciary duty need not be tied to any risk of
hand, the delegation of power to a court and, in practice, to the agency is much
fuller. The distinction is, therefore, not merely semantic.
Baxter, supra note 28, at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).
233 See supra part III.A (discussing the statutory basis for the formal enforcement powers).
The Third Circuit recently observed: "While the same act may be both an unsafe or unsound
practice under § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) and a breach of a fiduciary duty under § 1818(e)(1)(A)(iii),
we hesitate to make one a proxy for the other." Seidman, 37 F.3d at 932.
234 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (Supp. V 1993).
235 See supra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
236 For a claim of negligence to be actionable, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered a
legally cognizable injury compensable by damages. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 328A(d) (1964).
237 For example, in a final decision by the FDIC to remove an officer/director from office
that was based, in part, on lending and collection practices constituting unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices, the FDIC made specific findings that the respondent had deviated from "normal
and acceptable lending practices." *** Bank of *** County, ***, in 1 FDIC ENFORCEMENT
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 5042, at A-379 (Arthur L. Beamon & Nancy L. Alper eds., Supp.
1992). These findings likely would support also a finding that the respondent was negligent.
238 See Paul E. Oberstar, No. FDIC-91-19E, 1991 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 408, at *13 (Aug.
2, 1991) (stating that "for a onetime event to be found an unsafe or unsound practice, there must
be some showing that harm could reasonably result from that act").
239 See supra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
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insolvency to be actionable. Moreover, a finding of unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices does not require proof of actual loss; it requires only proof that
the practices might result in a loss. 4 For a breach of fiduciary duty to be
actionable, however, the plaintiff would have to prove some actual, rather
than predictive, loss.241
V. Reconciling the Safety and Soundness Duty and Fiduciary Duty
Based on the conclusion drawn in Part IV that both unsafe or unsound
banking practices (when applied to director conduct) and the fiduciary duty
of care share the same theoretical basis, this Part seeks to reconcile the differ-
ences between formal enforcement actions based on unsafe or unsound
banking practices and receivership actions based on breach of fiduciary duty.
Because both actions have negligence as their underpinning, the application
of the principles associated with each cause of action should produce similar
results and, in effect, create the same types of obligations. This Part con-
cludes that, in application, principles of safety and soundness can create a
higher standard of care than that required to discharge directors' fiduciary
duty of care. It finds that in many cases, the inconsistency between the appli-
cation of these two concepts is eliminated by statutory culpability require-
ments separate from unsafe or unsound banking practices. Finally, this Part
concludes that the agencies should adopt enforcement policies to resolve any
remaining inconsistencies.
A. Comparing the Discharge of Fiduciary Duty and the Discharge of the
Safety and Soundness Duty
Because the courts recognize the difficulty in reviewing business judg-
ments, they defer to directors' decisions under the business judgment rule
and focus their inquiry on the process of making those decisions.242 Similar
to fiduciary duty cases, safety and soundness cases involve a review of the
same type of conduct-the business judgments of directors. The business
judgment rule, however, arises under state law and thus will not be applied in
cases reviewing the agencies' formal enforcement actions because enforce-
ment actions arise under federal law. Furthermore, in formal enforcement
actions, courts defer to agency findings, overturning only those found to be
arbitrary and capricious. 243
For these reasons, although both the receivership and formal enforce-
ment actions involve a review of the same conduct, in the former, courts will
defer to the directors' judgments, while in the latter, courts will defer to the
agencies' judgments. In essence, directors are held to a higher standard of
care in the formal enforcement context than in the receivership context. The
following discussion assesses the justifications for this fundamental difference
in the treatment of director conduct. 244
240 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 236.
242 See supra part I.C.
243 See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
244 The business judgment rule and the policy justifications supporting the rule have been
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B. Assessing the Justifications for the Creation of a Higher Standard of
Care
1. Statutory Culpability Requirements
Except for the cease and desist power, all of the formal enforcement
provisions discussed herein require a finding of culpability such as "knowing"
or "reckless" conduct, in addition to the finding of an unsafe or unsound
banking practice. 245 In many instances, therefore, a formal enforcement ac-
tion will not involve the imposition of a higher standard of care due to these
separate culpability requirements. The agencies' cease and desist power,
however, does not contain similar culpability requirements and can be in-
yoked on the sole finding of an unsafe or unsound banking practice.246 Ac-
cordingly, directors may be held to a higher standard of care in a cease and
desist proceeding than in a receivership action.
This disparity can be justified perhaps by the differences in the sanctions
imposed, i.e., the imposition of a cease and desist order versus a judgment for
monetary damages.247 Although the cease and desist order is a public docu-
ment and may cause a degree of public disgrace, it does not impose the same
hardship on a director as does a judgment for monetary damages.248 The
imposition of a cease and desist order, however, can serve as the basis for
harsher sanctions.
Assume, for example, that one of the agencies finds that a bank and its
board of directors have engaged in unsafe or unsound banking practices. The
agency issues (most likely with the consent of the bank and the board) a
cease and desist order. The order requires, among other things, the board to
increase the bank's capital to a particular percentage of the bank's total as-
sets within 90 days. A breach of this cease and desist order, even if the direc-
tors acted with all due diligence to bring the bank's capital to the desired
level, could lead to an assessment of civil money penalties of up to $5,000 per
day against the bank.249 If it takes the board 190 days to increase the bank's
questioned on various grounds. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 55, at 1341-44 (evaluating the
bases for the rule); Gevurtz, supra note 55, at 289 (noting that the rule's rationales "fail to justify
a differentiation between directors and other prospective tort defendants who can and do assert
similar arguments for more lenient treatment"). Given that the law grants special treatment to
business judgments in state law negligence actions, the question remains whether the law should
grant the same treatment to business judgments that are the subject of formal enforcement
actions.
245 A second-tier civil money penalty requires a showing that the respondent recklessly
engaged in an unsafe or unsound banking practice. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B)(i)(II) (Supp. V
1993). A third-tier civil money penalty requires a showing that the respondent knowingly en-
gaged in an unsafe or unsound banking practice. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C)(i). The removal and
prohibition provisions require, in addition to the unsafe or unsound banking practice, a showing
of personal dishonesty or willful or continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the
bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C)(i)-(ii).
246 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
247 The agencies' cease and desist power includes the power to collect monetary awards,
but only if the respondent was unjustly enriched or acted with reckless disregard for the law. 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
248 See supra part IILB (discussing directors' monetary exposure).
249 A first-tier civil money penalty is available based on the violation of any final order. 12
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capital to the required level, the directors are each potentially liable for
$500,000 in civil penalties.250
A $500,000 penalty hurts the director no more or less than would a judg-
ment in a receivership action for $500,000 in damages.251 Yet, the types of
business judgments that may lead to unsafe or unsound practices do not dif-
fer fundamentally from the types of business judgments reviewed in suits al-
leging breach of fiduciary duty.
For these reasons, the statutory culpability provisions provided by Con-
gress for use in the formal enforcement context compensate partially for
what would otherwise be an imbalance in the standards of care applied to
directors in agency-initiated cases. The potential for imposing civil money
penalties, however, is troublesome, particularly in the light of the agencies'
routine practice of issuing cease and desist orders against directors and other
institution-affiliated parties without specific findings of any individual direc-
tor's wrongdoing. As a result, directors are forced to rely on the fair-minded-
ness of the agencies and hope that no external forces will force the agencies
to exercise the outer limits of their powers.
2. Expertise of the Agencies
Because differences in sanctions do not justify fully the differences in
reviewing business judgments, a comparison of the rationale for the defer-
ence given to the agencies in formal enforcement actions versus the rationale
for the deference given to directors' judgments in receivership cases may as-
sist in reconciling the disparities.
The rationale for deference enjoyed by directors in receivership cases
(through the operation of the business judgment rule) is that the courts
should refrain from second-guessing business judgments. Directors would
likely favor the passage of a statute that imposed the business judgment rule
on agencies' adjudication of actions alleging directors' unsafe or unsound
banking practices. Arguably, however, the business judgment rule does not
have a place in formal enforcement actions because the potential harm ad-
dressed by the business judgment rule (second-guessing of directors' deci-
sions) is not apparent when the adjudicator is a federal banking agency with
U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). There is no requirement that the violation of the
order be "knowing," "reckless," "negligent," or the like.
250 This example does not intend to suggest that the agencies act, or will act, in bad faith or
with poor judgment in enforcing the principles of safety and soundness. Rather, the presump-
tion is that agency officials perform their duties fairly and in good faith. See Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. Johnson, 8 F.3d 791, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Still, to the extent that Congress has given the
agencies a power that is, as argued here, excessively broad, Congress and other external forces
(such as public opinion or the press) may force the agencies to use that power to its fullest
extent. Professor Baxter has commented that "one cannot help but wonder whether the agen-
cies will be able to remain moderate in their deployment of the powers prescribed by section 39
[of the FDIA] if economic and political circumstances deteriorate." Baxter, supra note 89, at
219. Professor Baxter's comment relates to FDICIA's safety and soundness standards discussed
in Part II.D.2 of this Article.
251 Director and officer insurance policies and corporate indemnification will be of little
help. See supra part III.B.
[Vol 63:175
Bank Director Liability
expertise in reviewing the judgments of bank directors. This argument, how-
ever, assumes that the agencies are experts in reviewing business
judgments 25
2
The United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") has criticized
the agencies' applications of safety and soundness principles. The GAO
found inconsistent conclusions regarding safety and soundness (e.g., the
FDIC and OTS arrived at conflicting conclusions after examinations of the
same institution conducted within three months of each other),25 3 inadequate
quality control of the examinations,25 4 reliance on insufficient evidence (e.g.,
using outdated and incomplete data),25 5 and lack of specific guidance for
examiners.
25 6
Such criticisms, although significant, do not lead to the conclusion that
courts should never defer to the agencies in cases alleging unsafe or unsound
banking practices. Under the APA, courts must defer to the agencies, unless
the agencies' findings are not supported by substantial evidence.25 7 Never-
theless, these criticisms do support the conclusion that courts should refuse to
extend the deference that is afforded to the agencies beyond the APA's sub-
stantial evidence standard for review of agency actions.25 8
252 Because this Article focuses on the gap-filling functions of principles of safety and
soundness, the safety and soundness determinations discussed herein involve the highly discre-
tionary area of the business of banking that is not amenable to specific regulation. Given the
complexities and constant changes in the banking industry, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that
the agencies will always have actual expertise in areas governed by principles of safety and
soundness.
253 Thrift Examination Quality: OTS Examinations Do Not Fully Assess Thrift Safety and
Soundness, GAO AFMD-93-11, at 36 (Feb. 16, 1993). The GAO concluded that the inconsis-
tency between the agencies' findings "confuses thrift management and undermines the credibil-
ity of the regulatory process." Id.
254 See Bank Examination Quality: FDIC Examinations Do Not Fully Assess Bank Safety
and Soundness, GAO AFMD-93-12, at 46-52 (Feb. 16, 1993). The GAO found that "working
papers were not prepared in a manner that enabled independent reviewers to clearly judge the
competency and sufficiency of work performed by examiners." Id. at 49; see also Bank Examina-
tion Quality: FRB Examinations and Inspections Do Not Fully Assess Bank Safety and Sound-
ness, GAO AFMD-93-13, at 38-39 (Feb. 16, 1993) (finding that Fed examinations did not use
consistent methodology); Bank Examination Quality: OCC Examinations Do Not Fully Assess
Bank Safety and Soundness, GAO AFMD-93-14, at 37-38 (Feb. 16, 1993) (finding quality con-
trols inconsistent in OCC examinations).
255 See Bank Examination Quality: FDIC Examinations Do Not Fully Assess Bank Safety
and Soundness, GAO AFMD-93-12, at 18-20 (Feb. 16, 1993) ("Information needed to assess
loan quality was either missing, incomplete, outdated (over 1 year old), or unverified.").
256 See id at 20-22 (noting that examiners lack guidance on procedures for evaluating loan
quality when critical financial or collateral information is outdated); Bank Examination Quality:
FRB Examinations and Inspections Do Not Fully Assess Bank Safety and Soundness, GAO
AFMD-93-13, at 37-38 (Feb. 16, 1993) (stating that examiners lacked methodology to quantify
identified risks); see also Thomas M.L Metzger, FDIC Capital Directive Procedures: The Unac-
ceptable Risk of Bias, 110 BANr,O L.J. 237,254 (1993) (arguing that "an FDIC bank examiner
classifies assets by custom, not rule").
257 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Some of the noted criticisms would support
a finding that agency determinations are not entitled to deference. For example, a finding that
the agency relied on inadequate evidence to support its conclusions would fail the APA's sub-
stantial evidence requirement. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank of Bellalre v. Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 697 F.2d 674, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1983).
258 For example, perhaps courts should refrain from requiring deference to the findings of
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C. Inviting a Scheme of Consistent Duties
The pitfalls of inconsistent regulation are highlighted by the disparate
treatment of business decisions in formal enforcement actions versus receiv-
ership cases. For example, imposing an essentially higher standard of care in
formal enforcement proceedings has the anomalous effect of making it theo-
retically easier for directors to avoid liability when their banks fail (subjecting
them to receivership actions) than when the bank continues to operate (sub-
jecting them to formal enforcement actions).259 This could not have been
Congress's intent.
260
Inconsistent standards of care create confusion and undermine the credi-
bility of the regulators.261 In addition, this inconsistency could frustrate
banks' attempts to attract qualified individuals to serve on their boards.
Although the culpability requirements discussed in Part V.B.1 compensate
partially for the imbalance in the applicable standard of care, a clarification
of agency enforcement policies could eliminate any remaining asymmetry.
As discussed, the agencies appear to embrace the principles underlying
the business judgment rule.262 Moreover, in receivership actions brought by
the FDIC or RTC, the review of directors' conduct is restrained by the busi-
ness judgment rule (in state law actions) and by the section 1821(k) gross
negligence standard (in actions brought under federal law).263 The agencies
could apply similar restraints in formal enforcement actions brought on the
basis of unsafe or unsound banking practices. To do so would set a policy
that would define directors' unsafe or unsound banking practices as conduct
that meets, at a minimum, the level of culpability that would apply in an
action against the director in a receivership action.264 Agencies could adopt
an even plainer policy by providing that cases based on unsafe or unsound
banking practices will not be brought against directors unless their conduct
agency examiners. Although some authority supports the proposition that the courts, agencies,
and the AIT should defer to the agency examiner's determinations, see supra note 193 and ac-
companying text (discussing deference to examiners with regard to loan classifications), the
agencies should rely on their examiners' findings only if the examiners' experience justifies such
reliance, particularly given that the agencies recognize that some of their examiners lack exper-
tise. See Caleb D. West, Nos. AP 91-83, AP 92-155, 1991 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 520, at *1 (Dec.
4, 1992) (finding that "an inherent weakness in the case against Respondent was its fundamental
reliance upon inexperienced examiners"). Neither the courts, the agencies, nor the ALJs should
be required to defer to findings of examiners who lack the necessary expertise.
259 Formal enforcement actions can be brought also against directors after banks fail.
260 In addressing the issue of whether § 1821(k) preempts state simple negligence actions,
the Tenth Circuit noted that if § 1821(k) were to preempt such actions, it would create an incen-
tive for bank directors to allow the bank to fail because prior to failure, a simple negligence
standard would apply. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443,449 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert dismissed,
113 S. Ct. 516 (1992). It is unfathomable that directors (except the most devious ones) would
allow banks to fail in order to avail themselves of a more favorable standard of liability. It is also
difficult to believe that Congress intended a different standard to attach in each instance.
261 See supra note 253.
262 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
263 See supra parts I.B, I.C.
264 See supra part I.C (discussing that the applicable standard of care in most receivership
cases will be gross negligence).
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amounts to gross negligence or worse.265 Alternatively, the agencies could
provide that actions alleging directors' unsafe or unsound banking practices
will focus on the process of directors' decisionmaking and not the end results.
Because all of the above proposals affect only the agencies' cease and desist
authority,2 66 the adoption of any of them would constitute a relatively modest
restraint on the potential breadth of agency power and would promote a
principled approach to directors' duty of care in all actions brought by the
agencies whether acting as receiver or as a regulator.
Conclusion
The need to attract and retain qualified individuals to serve on bank
boards is widely recognized.267 The experience and business acumen of the
board may be the difference between success or failure in today's competitive
banking industry.268 To attract qualified women and men, the duties imposed
upon them must be well defined, clearly articulated, fair, and consistent.
If, as suggested by this Article, directors' safety and soundness duties are
akin to directors' fiduciary duties, then safety and soundness is not an amor-
phous concept. Instead, safety and soundness could be said to conform to the
most common form of director liability-fiduciary duty. Principles of safety
and soundness, however, cannot be viewed in a vacuum. They form the basis
for liability in specific formal enforcement actions. In the context of these
administrative proceedings, they can serve as a basis for the imposition of a
higher standard of care than that commonly applied to director conduct.
This Article concludes that although other statutory culpability require-
ments eliminate the imbalance in the standard of care in most formal en-
forcement actions, there remains some inconsistency. The agencies should
implement enforcement policies that would result in a consistent standard for
reviewing directors' conduct. Absent the implementation of such policies,
directors' liability for unsafe or unsound banking practices could be used to
heighten the fiduciary duties that govern director conduct. The regulators
have the ability, through appropriate and well-articulated regulations, to im-
pose duties on bank directors that exceed the duty of ordinary care. The
265 In addition, such conduct would have to have a reasonably direct effect on the bank's
financial integrity. See supra notes 102-126.
266 See supra part V.B.1 (discussing that because of culpability requirements separate from
unsafe or unsound banking practices, the standard of care in all other formal enforcement ac-
tions will be less than negligence and, perhaps, even less than gross negligence).
267 See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,422-23 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that FIRREA's legis-
lative history indicates an intent to attract quality directors); see also Joint Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Standards for Safety and Soundness, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,336, 31,337 (July
15,1992) (stating that safety and soundness standards should not be unclear because of the need
to attract qualified management); Weinstein, supra note 33, at 1501 (stating that "[t]he challenge
is to adhere to rules that strike the right balance-rules that sanction and deter self dealing and
other fraud and also that encourage rational corporate decision making practices, while not in-
hibiting well qualified persons from service as directors").
268 Increased competition from non-bank financial institutions has been cited as a factor
that intensified and prolonged the collapse of the thrift industry. NATIONAL COMM'N ON FIN.
INsT. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE:
A BLuEPRINT FOR REFORM 7-8 (July 1993).
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agencies' authority to impose such duties resides in their ability to define
unsafe or unsound banking practices. Formal enforcement actions, however,
should not be the means to achieve the same goal. Formal enforcement ac-
tions based on directors' unsafe or unsound banking practices (if such prac-
tices do not violate a law or regulation) should be used to address conduct
that is in dereliction of directors' fiduciary duties (as such duties are affected
by the business judgment rule) and poses a risk to the bank's financial sound-
ness. In this way, liability for unsafe or unsound banking practices addresses
both Congress's concern for the risk of bank insolvency and directors' fear of
an amorphous standard.
